MEHMOOD ALAM TARIQ AND ORS. ETC. versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. ETC.

Citation: [1988] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 379 · Decided: 11-05-1988 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: RANGANATH MISRA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

MEHMOOD ALAM TARIQ AND ORS. ETC. 
v. 
STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. ETC. 
MAY 11, 1988 
[RANGANATH MISRA AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.] 
Rajasthan State· and Subordinate Service (Direct Recruitment by 
combined Competition Examination) Rules 1962/Rajasthan Police 
Service Rules 1954/ Rajasthan Forest Services Rules 1962/ Rajas than 
Forest Subordinate Service Rules, 1963: Rule 15(1) Proviso/Rule 25-
Proviso (i)-Recruitment rule prescribing minimum qualifying marks in 
the viva voce test~uch rule whether incurs constitutional infirmity. 
Statutory Interpretation: Validity of Statutory provision-To be 
tested with reference to its operation and efficacy in generality of cases-
Not by freaks or exceptions that its applications might in some rare cases 
possibly produce. 
The Rajasthan Public Service Commission conducted an examina-
tion in 1985 for appointments to State Services. The recruitment rules 
contained a provision that candidates should secure a minimum of 33% 
marks in the viva-voce test. !>ome of the candidates who failed to secure 
the minimum marks in viva-voce challenged before the High Court the 
constitutionality of the provision in the Rules stipulating such minimum 
cut-off marks. The High Court declared the provision unconstitutional. 
Before this Court, it was urged on behalf of the selected candidates 
and the State of Rajasthan, that (1) the High Court fell into a serious 
error in importing into the present case principles .... which pertained 
to the proposition whether the setting apart of an excessive and dispro-
portionately high percentage of marks for viva-voce in comparison with 
the marks of the written-examination would be arbitrary; and (2) the 
prescription of minimum qualifying marks for the viva-voce test would 
not violate any constitutional principle or limitation, but was on the 
contrary a salutary and desirable provision. 
On the other hand, it was urged that (1) the principles laid down by 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
this Court, which the High Court had accepted; were sound 'and had 
acquired an added dimension in the context of the increasingly denuded 
G 
standards of probity and rectitude in the discharge of publice office•, and 
(2) the real thrust of the principles was that any marking-procedure that 
made the oral test determinative of the fate of a candidate was, in itself, 
arbitrary, and if this test was applied to this case, the decision reached by 
the High Court would be unexceptionable. 
379 
H 
A 
380 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
11988] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 
Allowing the appeals, it was, 
HELD:(l) A sensitive, devoted and professionally competent 
administrative set-up could alone undertake the ever-expanding social 
and economic roles of a welfare state.1387 A-BJ 
(2) The 'interview' was now an accepted aid to selection and was 
B 
designed to give the selectors some evidence of the personality and 
character of the candidates, which qualities were necessary and useful to 
public-servants. l388G-HJ 
(3) Academic excellence was one thing. Ability to deal with the 
public with tact and imagination was another. Both were necessary for an 
officer. The dose that was demanded may vary according to the nature 
C 
of the service. Administrative and Police Services constituted the cutting 
edge of the administrative machinery and the requirement of higher 
traits of personality was not an unreasonable expectation. [39lD1 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Lila Dfiar v. State of Rajasthan, 11982] 1 SCR 320 referred to. 
(4) The observations made by this Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav 
were in the context where the spread of marks for the viva-voce was so· 
enormous, compared with the spread of marks for the written examina-
tion, that the viva-voce test •tended to become the determining factor'. 
The reference was to the possibility of a candidate undeservedly being 
allotted high marks at the interview. That was a very different thing from 
the question whether a candidate should acquire at least a certain 
minimum percentage of marks at the viva-voce. l394B-C] 
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, 11985] Supp. 1SCR657 
explained. 
' 
State of U. P. v. Rafiquddin & Ors., (Judgment Today (1987) 4 SC 
257 referred to. 
(5) The prescription of minimum qualifying marks of 60 (33%) out 
of the maximum of 180 set apart for the viva-voce examination did not, 
by itself, incur any constitutional infirmity. The principles laid down by 
this Court in the case of Ajay Hasia Lila Dhar and Ashol< Kumar Yadav 
did not militate. agai

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.