LexMEET SINGH versus STATE OF PUNJAB
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A B c 1152 MEET SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB February 27, 1980 [D. A. DESAI AND A. D. KOSIIAL, JJ.] "Special Reasons" in ordinaiy and in the context of sentencing process-- Meaning of-Prevention of Corruption Act, Section 5(2) and proviso thereto scope of-Duty of the Court while exercising its discretion under the proviso, explained. Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 prescribes a minimum sentence of one year, in all.cases of conviction under the Act, with a proviso that the Court may for any special reasons r~orded in writing impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year. Tho petitioner was convicted for having committed offences under section 161 l.P. C. and Section 5 (2) of POCA and was sentenced to suffer R.I. for one year on each count and on the second count, also to pa.y a fine of Rs. 400/- D or in default to suffer further R.J. for three months by the learned Special Judge. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to n1n concurrently. Jn appeal the High Court, while maintaining the conviction, reduced the · substantive sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year to 1 the sentence undergone till the date of the' Judgment of the High Court and increased the E fine to Rs. 4,000 /- (Rupees four thousand) or in default to suffer further R.I. for one year. The I-ligh Court, while so altering the sentence, took into consideration two facts, namely, (i) that the petitioner was dismissed from service and (ii) that be is a family man. F Dismissing the special leave petition of the convict against his conviction, there being no appeal by St.re, the Court HELD: 1. The language of the proviso to Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act makes it abundantly clear that court is under an obligation to impose a minimum punishment once the conviction is recorded under Section 5 (2) and the minimum punishment of imprisonri1ent is for a term not less than one year. Undoubtedly the proviso confers power on the Court to a'vard less than the minimum punishment if the Court convicting ood sentencing the accused, (; is of the opinion that for any special reasons which the Court is under an obligation to record in writing, sentence of imprisonment for a term less than the minimum is called for. Conceding that the quantum of sentence is in the discretion of the trial Court, where the Legislature stepped in and Circum- scribed and fettered the· discretion by directing in1posing of a minimum sentence, the court can exercise its discretion within the limited spheres left open by legislature. The Legis};)ture circumscribed the discretion by reqriiring the 0 Court to impose minimum sentence but left it open to award less than the minimum statutorily prescribed for special reasons. The reasons have to be special reasons. The words 'special reasons' in the context in which they are • • t MEET SINGH v. PUNJAB (Desai, J.) 1153 <Used could only mean special to the accused on whom sentence is being imposed. A • The Court has to weigh reasons advanced in respect of each individual accused whose C'lSe is taken up for awarding sentence. [1155C·Gl In the instant case, there was no justification much less special reasons -matutorily required, for awarding less than the minimum sentence. Stricto sensu <:ourt exceeded its jurisdictjon while interlering with the quantum of sentence. f!l57EJ ''· Jagdish Prasad v. West Bengal, [1972] 2 S.C.R. p. 845 @ 851, relied on. I ~ .. 2. The word "special" has to be understood in contradistinction to word ·"general" or "ordinary". "Special" means distinguished by some unusual quality, ·out of the ordinary. Again "special" means 'particular'; peculiar; different from -Others; designed for a particular purpose, occasion, or person;· limited· in range; .con.fined to a definite field of action. 'fhus, anything which is common to a large class gove.med by the same statute· cannot be said to be: special to each <>f them. And, "special reasons" in the context of sentencing process must be special to the accused in tile case or special to the focts and circumstances <>f the case in which the sentence is being awarded. [1155G·H, 1156Al 3. In the instant .case, the only two reasons special according to the High <:ourt for ·awarding less than the minimum sentence are (i) appellant before it has lost his job and (ii) and he is a married mau with children. These two reasons would be comm
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