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MD. FIROZ AHMAD KHALID versus THE STATE OF MANIPUR & ORS.

Citation: [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1444 · Decided: 22-04-2025 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M.M. SUNDRESH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1444 : 2025 INSC 535
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid 
v. 
The State of Manipur & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 3797 of 2025)
22 April 2025
[M.M. Sundresh* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether a Muslim Member of the Bar Council of the State or the 
Union territory (Bar Council), duly elected as a Member of the 
Waqf Board (Board) constituted u/s.14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, 
can continue to hold the said position, even after the expiry of his 
tenure in the Bar Council.
Headnotes†
Wakf Act, 1995 – Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) – Appellant 
was elected as a Member of the Bar Council – Thereafter, 
he was appointed as one of the members of the 7th Waqf 
Board Committee, since earlier member-respondent no.3 had 
ceased to be the member of the Bar Council of Manipur – 
Respondent no.3 filed writ petition – The challenge was on 
the ground that there is no provision under the 1995 Act, 
which stipulates that a Member of the Board shall cease to 
continue in his position, if he is no longer a Member of the 
Bar Council – The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed 
the writ petition – However, the Division Bench of the High 
Court set aside the order appointing appellant as a member 
of the Board – Correctness:
Held: The words “for the removal of doubts” in Explanation II to 
s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, throw light on the clarificatory nature 
of the said Explanation – Although Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of 
the 1995 Act does not explicitly mention that the term of a Muslim 
Member of the Bar Council in the Board, is also co-terminus with 
their term in the Bar Council, this must be understood to be implied, 
upon a reading of the provision as a whole – This is because the 
eligibility of persons under the categories listed in s.14(b)(i), 14(b)(ii),  
and 14(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act, hinges on their membership in 
* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 
1445
Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors.
either the Parliament, or the State Legislative Assembly, or the 
Bar Council respectively – Without such membership in the 
Parliament, or the State Legislative Assembly or the Bar Council, 
the very basis for their membership in the Board ceases to exist – 
There is no satisfactory justification to exclude the applicability of 
Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to a Member of the 
Bar Council – Such an exclusion would, in fact, run contrary to 
the legislative intent behind the statute – The implied inclusion, 
is also supported by the two provisos appended to s.14(2) of the 
1995 Act – Therefore, respondent No. 3, who is no longer holding 
the said post of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, cannot be 
allowed to contend that even after he had ceased to be a Member 
of the Bar Council, he would be entitled to continue as a Member 
of the Board – Presently, the appellant is the only Muslim Member 
in the concerned Bar Council – There is no dispute with respect to 
the appellant’s eligibility to be a Member of the Board by virtue of 
his membership in the Bar Council – Thus, the impugned judgment 
set aside. [Paras 11, 12, 18, 19]
Constitution of India – Art.14 – Doctrine of reasonable 
classification – Applicability on Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) 
of the 1995 Act:
Held: Extending the applicability of Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of 
the 1995 Act, even to a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, is only 
but natural even in light of the doctrine of reasonable classification 
that has evolved from the jurisprudence on Art.14 of the Constitution 
of India, 1950, which provides for equality before the law and equal 
protection of the law – A classification would be reasonable only 
when there is an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus 
with the object sought to be achieved through the statute – In the 
instant case, giving an overreaching interpretation to Explanation 
II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to imply that a Muslim Member of 
the Bar Council shall continue to hold membership in the Board, 
despite losing their position in the former post, would amount 
to treating Members of Parliament and Members of the State 
Legislative Assembly differently from Members of the Bar Council – 
No intelligible differentia is discernible for such a classification from 
the scheme of the provision – In fact, it is tantamount to rewriting 
the provision in its entirety – Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 
1995 Act must be given a harmonious construction and purposive 
interpretation to mean that the 

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