MD. FIROZ AHMAD KHALID versus THE STATE OF MANIPUR & ORS.
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1444 : 2025 INSC 535 Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 3797 of 2025) 22 April 2025 [M.M. Sundresh* and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether a Muslim Member of the Bar Council of the State or the Union territory (Bar Council), duly elected as a Member of the Waqf Board (Board) constituted u/s.14 of the Wakf Act, 1995, can continue to hold the said position, even after the expiry of his tenure in the Bar Council. Headnotes† Wakf Act, 1995 – Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) – Appellant was elected as a Member of the Bar Council – Thereafter, he was appointed as one of the members of the 7th Waqf Board Committee, since earlier member-respondent no.3 had ceased to be the member of the Bar Council of Manipur – Respondent no.3 filed writ petition – The challenge was on the ground that there is no provision under the 1995 Act, which stipulates that a Member of the Board shall cease to continue in his position, if he is no longer a Member of the Bar Council – The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition – However, the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the order appointing appellant as a member of the Board – Correctness: Held: The words “for the removal of doubts” in Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, throw light on the clarificatory nature of the said Explanation – Although Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act does not explicitly mention that the term of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council in the Board, is also co-terminus with their term in the Bar Council, this must be understood to be implied, upon a reading of the provision as a whole – This is because the eligibility of persons under the categories listed in s.14(b)(i), 14(b)(ii), and 14(b)(iii) of the 1995 Act, hinges on their membership in * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1445 Md. Firoz Ahmad Khalid v. The State of Manipur & Ors. either the Parliament, or the State Legislative Assembly, or the Bar Council respectively – Without such membership in the Parliament, or the State Legislative Assembly or the Bar Council, the very basis for their membership in the Board ceases to exist – There is no satisfactory justification to exclude the applicability of Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to a Member of the Bar Council – Such an exclusion would, in fact, run contrary to the legislative intent behind the statute – The implied inclusion, is also supported by the two provisos appended to s.14(2) of the 1995 Act – Therefore, respondent No. 3, who is no longer holding the said post of a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, cannot be allowed to contend that even after he had ceased to be a Member of the Bar Council, he would be entitled to continue as a Member of the Board – Presently, the appellant is the only Muslim Member in the concerned Bar Council – There is no dispute with respect to the appellant’s eligibility to be a Member of the Board by virtue of his membership in the Bar Council – Thus, the impugned judgment set aside. [Paras 11, 12, 18, 19] Constitution of India – Art.14 – Doctrine of reasonable classification – Applicability on Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act: Held: Extending the applicability of Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, even to a Muslim Member of the Bar Council, is only but natural even in light of the doctrine of reasonable classification that has evolved from the jurisprudence on Art.14 of the Constitution of India, 1950, which provides for equality before the law and equal protection of the law – A classification would be reasonable only when there is an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved through the statute – In the instant case, giving an overreaching interpretation to Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act, to imply that a Muslim Member of the Bar Council shall continue to hold membership in the Board, despite losing their position in the former post, would amount to treating Members of Parliament and Members of the State Legislative Assembly differently from Members of the Bar Council – No intelligible differentia is discernible for such a classification from the scheme of the provision – In fact, it is tantamount to rewriting the provision in its entirety – Explanation II to s.14(1)(b) of the 1995 Act must be given a harmonious construction and purposive interpretation to mean that the
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