MATHURI AND ORS. versus STATE OF PUNJAB

Citation: [1964] 5 S.C.R. 916 · Decided: 11-12-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Dismissed
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Judgment (excerpt)

916 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1964] 
J963 
We have therefore come to the conclusion that 
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even if the Trial Court was right in thinking that 
V.R. Sadagopa Padmavathi was a Brahmin girl and not a Shudra, 
Naidu 
the position in law was, as found by the courts below, 
v; 
viz., it was a valid Hindu marriage and Bhakthavatha-
Bakthavatsalam salam a legitimate son of Sadagopa with all the rights 
& Anr. 
of a coparcener in regard to the joint family proper-
Das Gupta J. 
1963 
December 11 
ties and other matters. 
No other point was urged in appeal. The appeal 
is accordingly dismissed with costs. 
Appeal dismissed. 
MATHUR! AND ORS. 
v. 
STATE OF PUNJAB 
(P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K.C. DAS GUPTA JJ.) 
Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss.149 and 441 and 
Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1900) O.XXI, rr. 24 and 25-
Decree for possession-Period of execution warrants expired-
Attempt by landlords to take possession-If criminal trespass-
"Intention to annoy", meaning of-Resistance by tenants-If un-
lawful assembly. 
The appellants (in the main appeal) along with some others 
were tried for offences under ss. 148, 302 and 307 read withs. 149 
of the Indian Penal Code. The occurrence leading to their trial 
was as follows. Certain landlords got decrees for possession and 
armed with warrants for execution of the decrees and with the 
assistance of police they tried to execute the warrant and dispossess 
the tenants. The period of execution of the warrants had expired. 
A large armed mob including the appellants resisted and on the 
order of the District Magistrate the police opened fire. Ten 
persons from the mob and two persons from the other side died 
and a number of persons were injured. The appellants were 
found lying injured at the scene of occurrence after the mob re-
tired, The Sessions Judge convicted all the appellants of the 
offences under s. 148 of the Indian Penal Code and under 
s. 304 part I~ read with s. 149 and under s. 326/149 s. 324/149 
and 532/149 an? sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for 
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5 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
917 
seven years and acquitted all the others. The appellants as well as 
1963 
the State appealed to the High Court without success. Bodi 
the parties, thereafter filed the present appeals. 
Mathuri and ors. 
On behalf of the appellants (accused) it was contended that 
v. 
· 
since the date of the execution warrants had expired the attempt State of Punjab 
of the land lords to take possession of land amounted to criminal 
· 
· 
trespass and the appellants were entitled in law to resist them 
and therefore they did not form an unlawful assembly and had 
no objecno commit the offences alleged. 
Held, (i) The words in sub·r. 3 of r. 24 of the Order 21 
of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly show the intention of the 
legislature that the execution must be completed by the date speci• 
tied on the process for this purpose. To hold otherwise would 
be to ignore the force of the words "on or before which it shall 
be executed''. The words "the reason of the delay" occuring 
in r. 25 can on an ordinary grammatical interpretation be referred 
to the delay in returning the 
process to the· court. 
The 
warrants in the present case by reason of the expiry of the date 
mentioned therein had ceased to be executable on the date 
of the occurrence: 
Anand Lal Bera v. The Empress, l.L.R. 10 Cal. (1884) 18, 
Chelli Latchanna v. The Emperor, A.LR. 1942 Pat. 480, Nand Lal 
v. Emperor, A.LR. 1924 Nag. 68 and Kishori Lal v. Emperor, 
A.LR. 1934 All 1016, referred to. 
· 
(ii) The mere fact that the natural consequences of the entry 
was known to be annoyance to the person in possession .would 
not necessarily show that the entry was made "with intent to annoy" 
within the meaning of s. 441 of the Indian Penal Code. In order 
to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to 
annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court. to be 
satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was 
the aim of the entry. The Court has to take into consideration 
all relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge 
that the natural. consequences of the entry would be such annoy-
ance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of 
something else than the causing of such annoyance etc. being the 
dominant intention which prompted the entry. Taking all circum· 
stances of the present case the courts below were right in their 
view that crimi
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