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MATAJOG DOBEY versus H. C. BHARI

Citation: [1955] 2 S.C.R. 925 · Decided: 31-10-1955 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: SUDHI RANJAN DAS · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 22 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

2S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
MATAJOG DOBEY 
v. 
H. C. BHARI 
(WITH CONNECTED APPEAL) 
925 
[S. R. DAs, AcT!NG C.J., VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHA-
DAS, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA A1YAR JJ.] 
Constitution of India, Art. 14--Criminal Procedure Code (Act 
V of 1898), s. 197-Whether ultra vires the Constitution-Sanction 
undr:r s. 197-Reasonable connection between the act and discharge of 
Official duty-Need for sanction-When to be considered-Power con-
ferred or duty imposed-Implies power of employing all means for 
execution thereof. 
1n pursuance of a search warrant issued under s. 6 of the Taxa-
'tion on Income (Investigation Commission) 
Act, 
1947 authorising 
four Officials to search two premises in Calcutta, 
they went there 
and forcibly broke open the entrance door of a flat in one case and 
the lock of the door of a room in the other case. 
On being chal-
lenged by the darwan and the proprietor of the respective premises 
they were alleged to have tied the darwan with a rope, causing him 
injuries and to have 
assaulted 
the 
proprietor mercilessly with the 
help of two policemen and kept him in a lock up for some hours. 
Two separate complaints-one by the darwan and the other by the 
proprietor-under ss. 323, 342, etc., of the Indian Penal Code were 
instituted before two different Magistrates. 
The common question 
for determination in both the complaints was whether under the 
circumst:rnces sanction was necessary 
under s. 197 of the 
Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 
Held that sa.nction was necessary as the assault and the use of 
criminal force related to the performance of the official duties of the 
accused within the meaning of s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. 
Art. 14 does not render s. 197 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure ultra vires as the discrimination on the part of the Govern-
ment to grant sanction against one public servant and not against 
another is based on a rational classification. 
A discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power 
and abuse of power is not easily to be assumed where the discretion 
is vested in the Government and not in a minor official. 
In the matter of grant of sanction under s. 197 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the offence alleged to have 
been committed by 
the accused must have something to do, or must be related in some 
manner, with the discharge 
of official duty. 
In other words there 
must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge 
-0f official duty ; the act must bear such relation to the duty that the 
1955 
Octohr 31 
1955 
MoJajoz Dobey 
v. 
H.C. Bhari 
926 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1955} 
accuserl could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful 
claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. 
The need for sanction under s. 197 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure is 
not 
necessarily 
to be 
considered 
as soon as the 
complaint is lodged and on the allegations therein contained. The 
question may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complaint 
may not disclose that the act constituting the offence was done or-
purported to be done in the discharge of official 
duty ; 
but facts 
subsequently coming to light on a police or judicial inquiry, or even 
in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish 
the necessity for sanction. 
Whether sanction is necessary or not 
may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may 
reveal itself in the course of the progress of .the case. 
Where a power i!; 
conferred or a duty imposed by statute or 
otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise 
of the power or the performance of the duty by any limitations or 
restrictions, it is reasonable to hold that it carries with it the power 
of doing all such acts or employing such means as arc reasonably 
necessary for such execution, because it is a rule that when the law 
commands a thing to be done, 
it authorises the performance of 
whatever may be necessary for executing its command . 
. Gill and another v. The King, (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 41, Hori Ram 
Singh v. The Crown, (1939) F.C.R. 159, 178, Albert West Meads v. 
The King, (1948) L.R. 75 I.A. 
185, Lieutenant Hector Thomas 
Huntley v. The King-Empero1ยท, 
(1944) 
F.C.R. 262, Shreekantiah 
Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay. (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1177, 
Amrik Singh v. The State of PEPSU, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1302, Sarjoo 
Prasad v. The King-Emperor, (1945) F.C.R. 227, 
/ones v. Owe

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