LexaceLexace Ask the AI ›
⚖️ Ask the AI about your situation:🚗 Car Accident💼 Work / Job🏠 Housing / Eviction👪 Family / Divorce📋 Contract Dispute💰 Money Owed

MASJID FARKUNDA MOSQUE versus HAMED BASHA AND ORS.

Citation: [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. 421 · Decided: 02-12-1996 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI · Disposal: Dismissed

Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case

Judgment (excerpt)

MASJID FA,RKUNDA MOSQUE 
v. 
HAMED BASHA AND ORS. 
DECEMBER 2, 1996 
[K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.J 
Suit filed by appel/am for ejectme11t of respondents a11d for recove1y of 
possessio11 of suit prope1ty-Plea that super-stmcture was purchased by ap-
pellant i11 1975 from M u11der whom the third respondent came into possessio11 
A 
B 
as his sub-lessee-High Court rejected the claim of appellant and dismissed 
C 
his suit-Appeal-Held, it was admitted position that the 3rd defendant 
respondent had purchased the same land under a registered sale deed in the 
year 1969 much earlier to the appellant's purchasing the alleged super-stnicture 
on the said property-The 3rd defendant had also purchased the super- struc-
ture-In effect the decree sought for was against the real owner of the land, D 
namely, the third defendant-In these circumstances, the suit as framed by 
the appellanr was not coTTect/y decreeable-The High Court, therefore, was 
right in rejecting the claim of the appellant and dismissing the suit. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15698 of 
1996. 
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.4.96 of the Madras High 
Court in SA. No. 372 of 1983. 
A.T.M. Sampath and V. Balaji for the Appellant. 
The following Order of the Court was delivered : 
Leave granted. 
Though respondents have been served, they are not appearing either 
E 
F 
in person or through counsel. We have taken the assistance of Shri A.T.M. G 
Sampath, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, and have gone 
through the judgment and records placed before the Court. 
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Madras 
High Court, made on April 12, 1996 in Second Appeal No. 372/83. The 
appellant had filed a suit for ejectment of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 from H 
421 
422 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R. 
A the suit property and for recovery of possession thereof on the pleading 
that the house bearing Door No. 12-A and 12-B (Old No. 12-A) in Mosque 
Street, Royapuram, Madras-13 was his property; the super-structure there-
of was purchased by the appellant by sale deed dated September 13, 1975 
from Mohd. Hussain under whom the third respondent came into posses-
B sion as his sub-lessee. Therefore, the poS>eS>ion may be directed to be 
given to him. Though the trial Court and the appellant Court had held that 
the appellant is the owner of the property and the 3rd respondent is a 
sub-lessee of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the High Court has gone into the 
documentary evidence. It would appear that this property is situated in a 
triangular passage leading to Mosque Street, Adem Saheb Street and 
C Thoppa Modali Street in Madras City. It is also an admitted position that 
the 3rd defendant-3rd respondent had purchased the same land under a 
registered sale deed in the year 1969 much earlier to the appellant's 
purchasing the alleged super-structure on the said property. The High 
Court also found that the 3rd defendant had purchased the super-structure. 
D It is sought to be contended by the appellant that the lands, the subject 
matter of the purchase of the super-structure by the appellant and the 
respondents, are different and distinct and, therefore, the finding recorded 
by the High Court is not correct in law. We need not go into the question 
in this behalf for the reason that the appellant has proceeded on the 
premise that the 3rd respondent is a sub-lessee of respondent-defendant 
E Nos. 1 and 2 alleged to have been let in by Mohd. Hussain, who is said to 
be the owner of the super- structure from whom the appellant had claimed 
title. In effect the decree sought for is against the real owner of the land, 
namely, the third defendant. Under these circumstances, the suit as framed 
by the appellant was not correctly decreeable. The High Court, therefore, 
F was right on this ground in rejecting the claim of the appellant and 
dismissing the suit. 
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs. 
T.N.A. 
Appeal dismissed.