MANU BHUSAN ROY PRADHAN versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL
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842 MANU BHUSAN ROY PRADHAN v. STATE OF WEST BEN.GAL October 31, 1972 [J. M. SHELAT, Y. V. CHANDRACHUD AND l. D. lJuA, JJ.] Mainte11ance oi Internal Security Act, 1971-S. 3(2)~P·1blic Order- What it amoUnts 10 • . The petitioner was arrested and detained under s.9 read with section 3(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971 on the grounds:-(!) that on 16-4-71 at about 8 p.m. the petition.er, a member of the aciion squad of C.P.I. (ML), along with others, committed a murderous assault on one Shri Bulo Das Gupta, who later died in hospital. As a result of this crime, people of the locality became highly terrorised and the public peac.e was greatly disturbed: and (2) on 19·7·71 at 7.30 p.n\. the petitioner, along with others forcibly entered a school and set fire to the school buildings, causing irreparable loss to the institution with the object of causing dislocation in the present system of education and compelling the school authorities. to close it down and as a result oi the lire the teachers and the local people became panicky and the public peace was greatly disturbed. In this Court it was submitted by the counsel appearing as amicus curiae that the petitioner had been arrested on August 5, 1971 in connec· tion with six cases. He was bailed out on November JO, 1971 but was re-arrested soon thereafter. It was further submitted that ground no. 1 stated in the order of detention, was vague and had no rel.evance to the maintenanc-e of public order with the result that the petitioner's deten- ti<'n was illegal. Allowing the petition; HELD: (I) Ground no. I which do"' not mention the names or details of the others along with whom the petitioner was alleged to have committed the assault only refers to an assault on an individual \vhich prima facie appear to raise only a law and order problem. It merely mentions murderous assault by the petitioner on Bulo Das Gupta with- out showing either the nature of the weapon used or the natu're or ex- tent of the ~J>juries inflicted; it iilso does not disclose as to how long after the assault the injured 'person died: the motive or the purpse of the -assault is also not stated. The difference between maintenance of law and order and its disturbance and maintenance of public order lies A B c D E F in the degree and extent of disturbance and its effect on the current life of the community, Public order is the even tempo of the life of the com- munity taking the Country as a whole or even a specified locality. Dis~ turbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts direrted against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a .._:,\ general disturbance of public tranquillity. Public order indeed embraces ; •' more of the community than does law and order. [846 Fl G It is always a question of degree of the harm and its effect upon the community. The question to ask is : . "Does it lead to dtsturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of . t.he H . public order. or does it effeC't merely an individual leaving the trnnqutlhty of the society undisturbed ?" This question is to be answered 1n every case on facts. There is no rigid formula by V11hich one case can be distinguished from another. [847 HJ A B c D E F H M. B. ROY V. WEST BENGAL 843 Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709 and Arun Shah v. Slate of West Bengal, [ 1970] 3 S.C.R. 288, referred to. (ii) Jn the present case, the solitary incident of assault on one indivi- dual which may well be equated with an ordinary murder without any further details about the assault can hardly be said to disturb public peace or place public order in jeopardy so as to bring the case within the purview of the Act. It can only raise -a law and order problem and no more. (848 C-D] (iii) Ground no. 2, however, is quite germane to the problem . <?f maintenance of public order; but in the absence of ground no. 1, 11 is difficult to comprehend whether the detaining authority would have fe!t satisfied to make the impugned order. It has been laid down by I this Court that the requirement that the grounds must not be vagu~ has to ~e satisfied with respect to each of the grounds. Where power " vested m a statutory authority to deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if that satisfaction is st
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