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MANSI BRAR FERNANDES versus SHUBHA SHARMA AND ANR.

Citation: [2025] 10 S.C.R. 169 · Decided: 12-09-2025 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.B. PARDIWALA · Disposal: Disposed off

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 7 · see the full citation network in Lexace

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Judgment (excerpt)

[2025] 10 S.C.R. 169 : 2025 INSC 1110
Mansi Brar Fernandes 
v. 
Shubha Sharma and Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 3826 of 2020)
12 September 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the appellants, fall within the category of “speculative 
investors” so as to disentitle them from initiating proceedings u/s.7 
of the IBC; whether the Ordinance/Amendment Act introducing 
threshold requirements for filing of s.7 IBC applications by allottees 
was applicable to the facts of the present case.
Headnotes†
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.7 – NCLAT set 
aside the NCLT’s order and reversed the admission of the 
application filed u/s.7 by the appellants, holding that they 
were “speculative investors” and not genuine homebuyers/
financial creditors – Appellants, if fall within the category 
of “speculative investors” disentitling them from initiating 
proceedings u/s.7:
Held: 1.1 Yes – In C.A No. 3826 of 2020, the MoU executed 
reveals that possession was never contemplated – The agreement 
stipulated a buyback whereby Rs.35 lakhs invested would be 
returned with an additional Rs.65 lakhs as premium within 12 
months – Though four apartments were notionally “allotted”, the 
appellant paid only Rs.35 lakhs with no provision for the balance – 
Instead, the corporate debtor issued post-dated cheques of Rs.1 
crore, which were repeatedly dishonoured – Successive extensions 
of the MoU were granted without justification, and the appellant 
invoked proceedings u/s.138, N.I. Act for recovery. [Para 18.5]
1.2 Thus, the appellant’s true interest lay in assured returns, not 
possession – The MoU was in substance a buyback contract, not 
an agreement to sell flats – By the standard in Pioneer Urban 
case, the appellant was a speculative investor, disentitling her 
from invoking s.7. [Para 18.5]
* Author
170
[2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
1.3 Further, in C.A. No. 3903 of 2022, the MoU provided for an 
investment of Rs.25 lakhs per unit with assured returns of 25% 
per annum after 24 months – It contained a compulsory buyback 
clause and provisions for profit-sharing over and above guaranteed 
returns – The repeated use of the term “investment” coupled 
with a risk-free exit option, confirms that possession was never 
intended – While the NCLT admitted the appellant’s s.7 application 
ex parte, the NCLAT correctly reversed the order – A homebuyer 
cannot simultaneously demand refund with guaranteed returns 
while retaining the option to refuse possession. [Para 18.6]
1.4 On the facts and law, both the appellants are speculative 
investors – Their claims are in the nature of recovery, not insolvency 
resolution – Findings of the NCLAT treating the appellants as 
speculative investors upheld – Both impugned orders, setting 
aside admission of the s.7 applications, affirmed. [Paras 18.7, 18.8]
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 – IBC 
(Amendment) Act, 2020 – Appellants in C.A. No. 540 of 2021 
and C.A. No. 5495 of 2025 assailed the first impugned order 
passed by NCLAT on the limited ground of non-compliance with 
the 2019 Ordinance, promulgated on 28.12.2019 – Appellants 
stated that the s.7 petition under the IBC filed by Respondent 
No.1 on 02.01.2020, was reserved on 04.12.2019, i.e., prior 
to the promulgation of the Ordinance – As on 28.12.2019, 
the application was still pending consideration – Thus, the 
Ordinance and the subsequent Amendment Act squarely 
applied to the proceedings and the failure of Respondent 
No.1 to satisfy the threshold requirement mandated under 
the Ordinance was fatal to the maintainability of the petition – 
NCLAT held that the Ordinance (later enacted as Amendment 
Act, 2020) was inapplicable to the present case:
Held: Once orders were reserved, the appellant could not have 
complied with the Ordinance until pronouncement – To insist 
otherwise would be to compel the appellant to perform an 
impossibility contrary to the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia – 
The outcome on grounds of equity should be determined as on 
the date the order was reserved, and no subsequent legislative 
or administrative change should prejudice the parties – Where 
orders were already reserved prior to the promulgation of the 
Ordinance, the requirement cannot be retrospectively enforced 
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 
171
Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr.
so as to defeat vested rights – The subsequent compliance by 
the 

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