MANOJ SHARMA versus STATE & ORS.

Citation: [2008] 14 S.C.R. 539 · Decided: 16-10-2008 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Cited by 3 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this case
Judgment (excerpt)

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 539 
-- I 
MANOJ SHARMA 
A 
\/. 
STATE & ORS. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 1619 of 2008) 
OCTOBER 16, 2008 
B 
[ALTAMAS KABIR AND MARKANDEY KAT JU, JJ.] 
--+, 
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226: 
Quashing of criminal proceeding!Fl.R. by High Court -
In exercise of power/discretion under s.482 Cr.P CJ Article 226 c 
of the Constitution, when parties entering into settlement! 
compromise - Held: Exercise of such power by the High Court 
in no way limited by provisions uls.320 Cr.PC. - Power under 
s.482 Cr.PC./ Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary in 
nature and to be exercised on facts of each case - On facts, 
D 
continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exer-
. 
'( 
cise in futility, hence, quashed - Code of Criminal Procedure, 
, 
1973 - Ss. 320 and 482. 
Doctrines: 
E 
Doctrine of 'Judicial restraint' and 'Judicial activism' -
Applicability of. 
The question which arose for determination before 
this Court was as to whether a First Information Report 
F 
lodged against accused for committing the offences un-
,..___..._ 
der Ss. 471, 467, 420, 120-8 and s.34 IPC could be 
quashed either under s.482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of 
the Constitution of India, wh~n the accused and the com-
plainant have compromised and settled the matter be-
tween themselves. 
G 
Respondent-State submitted that having regard to 
4 
the specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure 
regarding compounding of offences, and indicating what 
539 
H 
540 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2008] 14 S.C.R. 
A 
offences may be compromised either with or without the 
)-------
leave of the Court, possibly the decision rendered in B. S. 
I 
Joshi's case required a second look. 
-
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
B 
HELD (Per Altamas Kabir, J.): 
1.1 The ultimate exercise of discretion under Section 
482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution is with 
.J.- -
the Court which has to exercise such jurisdiction in the 
facts of each case. It has been explained in B. S. Joshi's 
r 
c case that the said power is in no way limited by the provi-
sions of Section 320 CrPC. This Court is unable to dis-
agree with such statement of law. (Para - 6) [547-A & B] 
8. S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana 2003(4) SCC 
D 675 JT 2003(3) SC 277 =AIR 2003 SC 1386 - relied on. 
1.2 In view of the nature of the offences set out in the 
complaint, the High Court did not consider it an appropri-
J 
' 
7 
ate case for exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of 
),.-
the Constitution for quashing the same. The High Court's 
E refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the 
Constitution for quashing the criminal proceedings can-
not be supported. The First Information Report, which had 
been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute be-
tween the complainant and the accused is of a private 
F nature. It is no doubt true that the First Information Re-
port was the basis of the investigation by the Police au-
~ 
thorities, but the dispute between the parties remained 
' 
one of a personal nature. Once the complainant decided 
... 
not to pursue the matter further, the High Court could have 
G taken a more pragmatic view of the matter. The matter 
could have been considered by the High Court with 
greater pragmatism in the facts of the case. (Paras -- 7 & 
8) [547- C-G] 
I. 
+ 
~ 
' 
1. In the facts of this case, continuing with the criminal 
H proceedings would be an exercise in futility. Hence, the or-
MANOJ SHARMA v. STATE & ORS. 
541 
--) der of the High Court is set aside and the criminal proceed-
A 
ings pending before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Mag-
istrate is quashed. (Paras - 9 & ·10) [547-G-H; 548-A] 
Per Markandey Katju, J. (Concurring): 
1.1 A perusal o.f Section 320 Cr.P.C. shows that of-
B 
fences under Section 46.8, 471, 34 and 120-B IPC, as men-
~ tioned in the FIR in question, cannot even be com-
pounded with the permission of the Court. In fact, Sec-
tion 320(9) Cr.P.C. expressly states that no offence shall 
be compounded except as provided by this Section. The c 
offences mentioned in the FIR were not compoundable 
except in relation to the allegations about Section 420 IPC. 
There are other provisions in the IPC which apparently 
cannot be compounded even with the permission ot the 
Court in view of Section 320 (9) Cr.P.C. However, this was 
D 
creating a lot of difficulty and hardship to the public and 
)' 
hence a way out was found by this Court in B. S. Joshi and 
Others vs
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.