MANOHAR JOSHI versus NITIN BHAURAO PATIL AND ANR.

Citation: [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 421 · Decided: 11-12-1995 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.S. VERMA, N.P. SINGH, K. VENKATASWAMI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

MANOHAR JOSHI 
A 
v. 
NITIN BHAURAO PATIL AND ANR. 
DECEMBER 11, 1995 
[J.S. VBRMA, N.P. SINGH AND K. VENKATASWAMI, JJ.] 
B 
Election Laws : 
Representation of the people Act 1951.-Sections 81(1), 81(3), 82, 83, 
86, 99, 100( 1) (b ), 177. 
Election petition-Allegation of corrnpt practice--l'roof of-Require-
ment at the trial is higher and confined to strict legal evidence. 
S 81(1), and S 81(3).-lnterpretation of 
c 
Consent-Nature of-Presumption that party leaders are agents of can- D 
didate not co"ect. 
Vicarious liability of candidate for practices adopted by party mem-
bers-Arises when he consents. 
Non-compliance with S 81(3),~ffect of 
'Hindutva'--Does not invariably mean Hindu religion, and the context 
and purpose of the use is to be considered in arriving at a decision. 
E 
The Appellant who was supported by the BJ.P.-Shiv Sena alliance, 
won the election from Dadar constituency of Bombay. The Respondent who F 
was the Congress candidate and lost the election to the Appellant, chal· 
lenged the election of the Appellant before the High Court at Bombay on 
the ground of corrupt practice under S 123(3) & (3A), of R.P. Act and 
relied on the speeches delivered on 24.2.90, at Shivaji Park both by the 
candidate as also the BJ.P/Shiv Sena Party leaders and on the audio and G 
video cassettes played during the election campaign. However the audio 
cassettes were not produced before the Trial Court and video cassettes 
were produced not with the petition but later during the trial. 
The Trial court allowed the election petition after rejecting the 
contention of the successful candidate that the petition was time-barred. H 
421 
422 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R. 
A The election of the Appellant was therefore declared void on the ground 
under S lOO(l)(b) of R.P. Act. 
In appeal to this court, on behalf of the Appellant, illter alia, the 
following submissions were made. (1) The election petition ought to be 
B dismissed u/s 81 (l) of the R.P. Act, since the said Act was a self contained 
code and no provision outside the Act can be nsed to compute limitation. 
(2) The election petition and its copy should satisfy the requirements u/s 
81(3) of the R.P. Act, and this was not met since neither the video cassettes 
nor the transcript thereof was supplied though reliance was placed on it 
in the petition. (3) There is deficiency in relying on video cassettes for 
C pleading corrupt practice and this is hit by 06 Rl6 CPC, leaving only the 
speeches as the basis of the allegation of corrupt practice. (4) No corrupt 
practice u/s 123(3) or (3A) of the R.P. Act is established by either the 
pleadings or the relevant and admissible evidence produced before the 
Trial Court. 
D 
Countering the arguments on behalf of the respondent it was sub-
mitted (1) The scheme of the R.P. Act and the legislative history of 
limitation show that S.10 of the General Clauses Act would apply for 
calculating the period of limitation. Reliace was placed on the maxim 'lex 
non Cojit ad impossibi/ia'. The petitioner has a right to present the petition 
E on the last day which was 14.4.90, and that being a holiday, the petition 
was presented on 16.4.90, which was the first working day thereafter, and 
hence the petition was within the lim1tat" .n. (2) Neither the video cassette" 
nor the transcript was filell with the petition 1nd therefore not sen l.1g the 
same with the copy of the petition on the Appellant did not amount to 
p non-compliance with S 81(3) of the R.P. Act. (3) Corrupt practice was 
properly pleaded in the petition and the fact that the Appellant had 
admitted to the existence and use of the video cassettes can be taken as 
proof of the pleadings. (4) The consent of the candidate to the speeches of 
acknowledged party leaders should be implied from the relationship of the 
candidate to these leaders through the party links. In fact the party leaders 
G are to be assumed to be the agents of the candidate. Therefore the speeches 
of the party leaders may be termed corrupt practice; then the ground u/s 
lOO(l)(b), of the R.P. Act would be available for setting aside the election. 
Unless this presumption is available the candidate would be able to take 
the benefit of speeches made on the ground of religion and this would 
H vitiate against the very essence of democracy and the object of the Act. 
' 
MANOHARJOSHI v. N.B. PATIL 
423 
Allowing the Appeal, this Court 
HELD : 1.1. The finding recorded by the High Cour

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