MANJU SURANA versus SUNIL ARORA & ORS.

Citation: [2018] 3 S.C.R. 696 · Decided: 27-03-2018 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: JASTI CHELAMESWAR · Disposal: Matter referred to larger bench

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Judgment (excerpt)

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MANJU SURANA
v.
SUNIL ARORA & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 457 of 2018)
MARCH 27, 2018
[J. CHELAMESWAR AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 –  s.19 – Previous sanction
necessary for prosecution – Allegation of corruption in respect of
a public servants – Prior sanction for prosecution – Requirement
of, before setting in motion even the investigative process u/s. 156(3)
Cr.P.C – Held: Question would be whether in cases of the P.C. Act,
a different import has to be read qua the power to be exercised
u/s. 156(3) – Whether on account of s.19(1), the scope of inquiry u/
s. 156(3) Cr.P.C. can be said to be one of taking ‘cognizance’
thereby requiring the prior sanction in case of a public servant –
Prior sanction to prosecute a public servant for offences under the
P.C. Act is a provision contained under Chapter 14 Cr.P.C. – Thus,
it has to be seen whether such a purport can be imported into
Chapter 12 Cr.P.C. while directing an investigation u/s. 156(3)
Cr.P.C., merely because a public servant would be involved – In
view of the complexity arising in respect of the interplay of the P.C.
Act offences read with the Cr.P.C., matter referred to larger Bench –
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 156(3).
Referring the matters to larger Bench, the Court
HELD: 1.1 There is no doubt that even at the stage of
156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, while directing
an investigation, there has to be an application of mind by the
Magistrate. Thus, it may not be an acceptable proposition to
contend that there would be some consequences to follow, were
the Magistrate to act in a mechanical and mindless manner. That
cannot be the test. [Para 33] [713-F]
1.2 The question would be whether in cases of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, a different import has to be
read qua the power to be exercised under Section 156(3) of the
Cr.P.C., i.e., can it be said that on account of Section 19(1) of the
[2018] 3 S.C.R. 696
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P.C. Act, the scope of inquiry under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
can be said to be one of taking ‘cognizance’ thereby requiring
the prior sanction in case of a public servant. It is trite to say that
prior sanction to prosecute a public servant for offences under
the P.C. Act is a provision contained under Chapter 14 of the
Cr.P.C. Thus, it has to be seen whether such a purport can be
imported into Chapter 12 of the Cr.P.C. while directing an
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., merely because
a public servant would be involved. [Para 34] [713-G; 714-A-B]
1.3 It was observed in Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya
Pradesh that even at a pre-cognizance stage under Section 156(3)
of the Cr.P.C., it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to
register an FIR and that even if the Magistrate does not say in
so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3)
of the Code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the
officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding
the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that
police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter
XII of the Code only thereafter. The apprehension expressed by
ASG arises from these observation. [Para 35] [714-C-D]
1.4 The complete controversy referred to aforesaid and the
conundrum arising in respect of the interplay of the P.C. Act
offences read with the Cr.P.C. is, thus, required to be settled by
a larger Bench. [Para 36] [714-E]
Crl.M.P. 161/2015 IN SLP (Crl.) No. 5838/2014.
2.1 In the present Special Leave Petition, notice was
issued to the respondents, except respondent No. 4. Since the
proceedings before the Magistrate at the threshold were directed
to be kept in abeyance without notice to the respondent, and
thereafter the revision petition was dismissed in limine by the
High Court, the occasion for respondent No.1 to have
knowledge of the proceedings did not arise. Respondent No.1
sought deletion from the array of parties in these proceedings as
he has been wrongly arrayed as a party. The said plea is
predicated on the averments in the complaint itself, which seeks
to make a grievance over the actions of the Principal Secretary,
Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED) in which
MANJU SURANA  v. SUNIL ARORA & ORS.
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capacity respondent No.1 is stated to have been arrayed. It is
averred in the 

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