MANISHA RAVINDRA PANPATIL versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
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[2024] 9 S.C.R. 770 : 2024 INSC 762 Manisha Ravindra Panpatil v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 10913 of 2024) 27 September 2024 [Surya Kant and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Appellant-Sarpanch was removed from office on the allegations of encroachment of government land by her. Whether the disqualification of the appellant was justified. Headnotes† Women representatives in elected bodies – Prejudicial treatment at all levels of administrative functioning, deprecated – Allegations made by the private respondents as regards encroachment of government land by the appellant, a female Sarpanch – Mechanical orders passed by authorities, appellant removed from office – Removal affirmed by High Court – Justification: Held: There is no credible and convincing material on record to substantiate the allegations of encroachment of government land by the appellant before or post her election as Sarpanch – Nature of allegations and the consequential removal from the office of Sarpanch, highly disproportionate – Matter of removal of an elected public representative should not be treated so lightly, especially when it concerns women belonging to rural areas – Impugned order set aside – Appellant to continue and perform the duties of Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat till the completion of her tenure. [Paras 10-12] List of Keywords Sarpanch; Women representatives; Female Sarpanch; Disqualification; Removal from office; Private respondents; No professional misconduct; Encroachment of government land; Punishment disproportionate; Mechanical/summary orders; Women empowerment. [2024] 9 S.C.R. 771 Manisha Ravindra Panpatil v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10913 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in WP No. 4577 of 2023 Appearances for Parties Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, Sr. Adv., Vatsalya Vigya, Ms. Gautami Yadav, Ms. Pranjal Chapalgaonkar, Ms. Sapna Sinha, Akshay Sinha, Advs. for the Appellant. Prashant Shrikant Kenjale, Shrirang B. Varma, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Ms. Preet S. Phanse, Adarsh Dubey, Advs. for the Respondents. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Order 1. Leave granted. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. The appellant is an elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Vichkheda situated in Jalgaon District of Maharashtra. She contested in the panchayat elections and won in February, 2021. A dispute subsequently arose between the appellant and respondent nos. 5 to 7 (hereinafter referred as ‘the private respondents’), who sought her disqualification on the ground that she was allegedly residing with her mother-in-law in a house erected upon government land. The appellant however, had vehemently contended that she does not reside in that particular dwelling, and that she lives separately with her husband and children in a rented accommodation. She further contended that the concerned dwelling was in such a dilapidated condition that it could not be inhabited. 4. However, without appropriately verifying these factual issues and on the basis of bald statements, the concerned Collector passed an order disqualifying the appellant from continuing as Sarpanch. This order was thereafter confirmed by the Divisional Commissioner. Subsequently, the High Court vide the impugned order, dismissed 772 [2024] 9 S.C.R. Digital Supreme Court Reports the appellant’s writ petition against the Commissioner’s order on a technical ground, thus putting a seal of approval on her removal from office. 5. This seems to us a classic case where the residents of the village could not reconcile with the fact that the appellant, being a woman, was nevertheless elected to the office of the Sarpanch of their village. They were perhaps further unable to come to terms with the reality that a female Sarpanch would make decisions on their behalf de jure and that they would have to abide by her directions. 6. It is patently obvious that these were the primary motivations which led the private respondents to initiate their orchestrated efforts towards the removal of the appellant, from her duly elected position. Having found no instance of professional misconduct on the part of the appellant that they could etch away at, the private respondents instead embarked on
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