MANIK TANEJA & ANR. versus STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.

Citation: [2015] 1 S.C.R. 156 · Decided: 20-01-2015 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: V. GOPALA GOWDA · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
[2015) 1 S.C.R. 156 
MANIK TANEJA & ANR. 
V. 
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. 
(Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 2015) 
JANUARY 20, 2015. 
[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.] 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Quashing 
of criminal proceedings - Permissibility - Comments posed 
c on Traffic Police Facebook page by the appellant against 
respondent-Po/ice Inspector alleging harassment - FIR by 
the Inspector against the appellants ulss 353 and 506 /PC -
Petition for quashing FIR - Dismissed by High Court as 
premature -
On appeal, held: The FIR was liable to be 
0 
quashed as it does not disclose the alleged commission of 
offence - Continuance of the prosecution would amount to 
abuse of process ()f the Court - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 353 
and 506. 
E 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1. When a prosecution at the initial stage is 
asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court 
is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made, 
prima facie, establish the offence. It is also for the Court 
F to take into consideration any special features which 
appear in a particular case to consider whether it is 
expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the 
prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the 
Court, the chances of ultimate conviction is bleak and no 
G useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a 
criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may quash 
the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary 
stage. [para 9] [160-G-H; 161-A-B] 
H 
156 
MANIK TANEJA & ANR. v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 157 
ANR. 
State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal 1995 (1) SCR 712 = A 
(1995) 2 sec 449 - relied on 
2. The essential ingredients of the offence under 
Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the 
offence should have assaulted the public servant or used 
8 
criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the 
public servant from discharging his duty as such public 
servant. In the present case, there is absolutely nothing 
on record to show that the appellants either assaulted 
the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the 
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second respondent from discharging his official duty. 
Thus, the ingredients of the offence under Section 353 
IPC are not made out. [para 12] [162-B-C-D] 
3. T~e act of the appellants posting a comment on the 
Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal 
D 
intimidation in Section 503 IPC. In the instant case, the 
allegation is that the appellants have abused the 
complainant and obstructed the second respondent from 
discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of 
the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused 
E 
that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what 
he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal 
intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause 
alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit 
to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any 
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intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring 
in the application of this section. But material has to be 
placed on record to show that the intention is to cause 
alarm to the complainant. From the facts and 
circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no 
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intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the 
minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in 
discharge of his duty. [para 15] [163-E, B-D] 
4. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 
Cr.P.C., the court should be extremely cautious to 
H 
158 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 
A interfere with the investigation or trial of a criminal case 
and should not stall the investigation, save except when 
it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR 
does not disclose commission of offence and that 
continuance of the criminal prosecution would amount 
B to abuse of process of the court. In the facts and 
circumstances of the case, it would be unjust to allow the 
process of the court to be continued against the 
appellants and consequently the order of the High Court 
is liable to be set aside. [para 16) [163-F-G; 164-8) 
c 
Case L.aw Reference : 
1995 (1) SCR -712 
relied on 
para 9 
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal 
0 
No. 141 of 2015 . 
. From the Judgment and Order dated 24.04.2014 of the 
. High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Petition No. 
252 of 2014. 
E 
Bharadwaj S. Iyengar, Vikas Upadhyay for the Appellants. 
F 
Joseph Aristotle, Priya Aristotle, M. B. E

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