MANAGING DIRECTOR, UTTAR PRADESH WAREHOUSING CORPORATION & ANR. versus VINAY NARAYAN VAJPAYEE

Citation: [1980] 2 S.C.R. 773 · Decided: 16-01-1980 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.S. SARKARIA · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 8 judgment(s) · cites 4 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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l-1ANAGING DIRECTOR, UTTAR PRADESH WAREHOUSING 
CORPORATION & ANR. 
l' . 
VINAY NARAYAN VAJPAYEE 
January 16, 1980 
[R. S. SARKARIA AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.] 
·LJ1hour dispute-Employer-A Statutory Corporation-Disnzissed an e1npToyee 
'lV-ithout giving an c-pporJunity of being_ heard-Validity of. 
·Statutory bodies-Rights of employees under. 
Constitu1ion of India-Article 226-Scope of-High Court issued Writ of 
-Certiorari qutJshing order of di.unissal and ordered reinstatement of en1ployee 
with full back l'l-'oges--Il con1petent to order reinstaten1ent. 
The respondent was an employee of o statutory body. On allegations of 
·theft, misappropriation of stocks and certain other irregularities a preliminary 
Cnquiry was conducted by the I\fanaging Director (the appellant) and charge~ 
were framed against the employee. In the explanation submitted by him he 
expressly demanded that he wished to cross-examine certain witnesses whose 
names were given by him, and wanted to examine certain other persons a! 
witnesses. A few months thereafter, the appellant passed the impugned order 
of dismissal and required him to pay Rs. 549 j- on account of certain com· 
modities allegedly misappropriated by him. 
The employee's petition under Article 226 for tQa issue of a writ of certiorari 
·was rejected by a single Judge. The Division Bench allowed the writ on the 
ground that the Corporation which was required to act in a 
quasi-judicial 
·manner failed to give an opportunity of being heard to the dismissed employee 
and that therefore the order of dismissal was bad. 
On appeal, the appellant contended that 
Regulation 16 providing for an 
enquiry and giving an opportunity to an employee against whom an enquiry 
·"'tls to be held for misconduct had not come into force when the respondent 
was dismissed and, therefore, he had no statutory status and no locus-standi 
to maintain the writ which in substance was for specific performance of a 
..contract of service. 
D~smissing the appeal, 
HEID : (Per Sarkaria, J.) 
1. The impugned· order of dismissal was bad in law and had been rightly· l!et 
aside by the High Court [781 F] 
(a) Regulations defining duties, conduct and conditions of its employees 
framed by statutory bodies have the force of law. 
The form and content of 
contract with a particular employee being preScriptive and statutory, 
the 
statutory bodies have no free hand in framing the terms and conditions of 
tervice to their employees, but are bound to apply them as laid down in the 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(!980) 2 S.C.R. 
regulations. 
The regulations give the employees a statutory stntus oind impose 
obligations on the statutory authorities, and that they 
cannot deviate frorn 
the conditions of service laid down therein. 
There is no personal element 
in public employment and service. 
Whenever employees rights are affected 
by a decision taken under statutory powers the court would presume the 
existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and compliance by 
the statutory body with rules and regulations in1posed by the statute. [779 E·G} 
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Rani [1975] 3 SCR 619 referred to 
In the instant C•Jse the appellant v,.ns a statutory body and, therefore, even 
if at the time of dismissal the statutory regulations had not been framed or 
had not come into force, employment being public employment, the employer 
could not terminate the employee's services without due enquiry in accord-
ance with the regulations in force or in the absence of any regulations, in 
accordance with the rules of natural justice. 
Such on enquiry into the conduct 
of a public employee is of a quasi-judicial character. The respondent was 
employed by the Corporation in exercise of the powers conferred on it by the 
statute and, th~refore, the Corporation's pO\Ver to dismiss the respondent from 
service was derived from this statute. 
The court would presume the existence 
of a duty on the part of the dismissing authority to observe rules of natural 
justice and to act in accordance with the spirit of the regulation which was: 
then on the anvil and came into force shortly' after the dismissal. 
Secondly, 
in the instant case no regular departmental enquiry \Vas hekl. 
The order of 
dismissal was passed summarily after perusing the employee's explanation. The 
rules of natural justice require that the dismissed e1nployee s·houlJ be given 
a reason

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