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MANAGEMENT OF KALPATARU VIDYSAMASTHEY (R) AND ANR. versus S.B. GUPTA AND ANR.

Citation: [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 152 · Decided: 12-09-2005 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

A MANAGEMENT OF KALPATARU VIDY A SAMASTHEY (R) AND ANR. 
v. 
S.B. GUPTA AND ANR. 
SEPTEMBER 12, 2005 
B 
[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND H.K. SEMA, JJ.] 
Service Law: 
Adhoc appointment-Probation period-Expiry of-Employee relieved 
C from service-Challenge ti:r-Held: Employee has no right to continue in the 
post as the appointment came to an end by ejjlux of time. 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section I I 5-Revisional Jurisdiction-
Finding of facts-Interference with-Scope of-Held: High Court in its 
revisional jurisdiction cannot reappreciate evidence and interfere with the 
D findings unless they are perverse and there has been non-application of mind. 
The question which arose for consideration in the present appeal is 
whether respondent-employee appointed on probation could be reliβ€’ .. .!<I 
from service on expiry of probation period. 
E 
Allowing the appeal, the Court. 
HELD 1. It is now well-settled principle of law that the appointment 
made on probation/adhoc for a specific period comes to an end by efflux 
of time and the person holding such post can have no right to continue in 
the post. Having accepted the terms and conditions stipulated in the 
F appointment order and allowed the period for which he was appointed to 
have been lapsed by efflux of time, respondent is not permitted to turn 
back and say that the appointment de-hors the Rules or the terms and 
conditions 5tipulated in the appointment, were not legally valid. 
(155-G; 156-D) 
G 
Dir., Institute of Management Development v. Pushpa Srivastava, AIR 
(1992) SC 2070, relied on. 
2.1. It is also well-settled principle of law that the High Court in its 
revisional jurisdiction under Section II5 CPC cannot reappreciate the 
evidence and interfere with the findings unless it is found that the findings 
II 
152 
MANAGEMENT OF KALPATARU VlDYA SAMASTHEY ( R )v. SB. GUPTA [SEMA, J] J 53 
recorded by the lower court are perverse or there has been non-application A 
of mind. 1156-D-E-F) 
Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan v. Tu/ail Mohammed, AIR 1991 SC 45, 
referred to. 
2.2. There is no findings of the High Court that the findings of fact B 
recorded by the courts below is perverse and there has been non-
application of mind. The High Court has erred in law as well as in facts 
by setting aside the well-reasoned order of the Tribunal. 
(156-H; 157-A-B) 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3536 of2003. C 
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.8.2002 of the Kamataka High 
Court in C.R.P. No. 2959 of 2000. 
S.N. Bhat for the Appellants. 
Subodh Markandya and P.R. Ramasesh for the Respondents. 
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 
D 
H.K. SEMA, J. This appeal filed by the appellant Kalpataru Vidya 
Samsthe, Tiptur, Tumkur District, in short 'KVS', is directed against the 
judgment and order dated 19.8.2002 passed by the High Court of Kamataka E 
at Bangalore in C.R.P.No.2959 of2000, in exercise of its power under Section 
115 C.P.C. The High Court has set aside the order dated 27.5.2000 passed in 
MA (Eat) No.2 of 1996 by the Additional District Judge, Education Appellate 
Tribunal, dismissing the appeal of the respondent herein under Section 94 of 
the Kamataka Education Act. 
F 
The basic facts may be noted. The respondent no. I was appointed as 
Assistant Professor in Mechanical Engineering Department of Kalpataru 
Institute of Technology by an order dated 6.9.1994 in the scale of Rs.3 700-
125-4950-150-5700 at Rs.3700 basic pay and other allowances as are 
admissible under the rules and regulations on temporary basis for a probation G 
period of one year commencing from 7.9.1994 till 7.9.1995. The said 
appointment carries a stipulation in Clause 11 that the appointment would be 
on probation for one year and thereafter the same would be reviewed. On the 
strength of the appointment, the respondent no. I reported to duty on 7.9.1994 
and worked till 31.8.1995. Before the completion of the probation period, the 
respondent no.I was relieved from service w.e.f. 31.8.1995 and on 1.9.1995 H 
154 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. 
A he was again appointed afresh on probation for a period of six months i.e. up 
to 29.2.1996. His basic salary was, however, fixed at Rs.3825 with other 
allowances. Clause 11 of the said appointment order clearly stipulated that 
the appointment was purely temporary and up to 29.2.1996. Pursuant to the 
aforesaid appointment the respondent no. I joined the duty on 4.9.1995. On 
B completion of the period of probation, the 

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