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MALOJIRAO NARASINGHRAO SHITOLE versus THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

Citation: [1969] 3 S.C.R. 901 · Decided: 07-03-1969 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: M. HIDAYATULLAH · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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MALOJIRAO NARASINGllRft.0 SHITOLE 
v. 
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
March 7, 1969 
[M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., V. RAMASWAMI AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.] 
Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act 28 of 1951, s. 29-Appeal 
to Board of Revenue-No provision in Act for exclusion of time for 
obtaining copies or to condone de/ay-S. 30 of Act making Ryotwari 
Land Revenue and Tenancy Act Samwat 2007 applicable to proceedings 
under Act-Effect of ss. 34 o·nd s. 149(2) of Ryotwari Act-Construction 
of s. 149(2)-App/icability of s. 12 of Indian Limitation Act 1908. 
Section 29 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act 28 of 1951 
provided for appeals against orders of the Jagir Commissioner to the 
Board of Revenue. The appeal was to be filed within 90 days of the com-
munication of the decision to the party concerned. The Act did not in 
terms contain any provision for exclusion of time taken in obtaining co-
pies or for <Pndonation of delay in filing the apJ?"al· 
However under s. 
30 of the Act the procedure under the Ryotwan 
Land 
Revenue 
and 
Tenancy Act, Samwat 2007 was made applicable to the proceedings. Sec-
tion 34 of the said Ryotwari Act provided for extension and computation 
of the period of limitation and s. 149(2) thereof was in the following 
terms : "Excpt where it is otherwise ptovided" in the general principles of 
law of Limitation for the time being in force in the United State regard-
ing extension of the principles of limitation 
sha11 appJy to claims made 
under this Act before a Revenue Officer ... 
' 
The appellant was a Sardar and Jagirdar in the erstwhile Gwalior State. 
His Jagir was resumed by the State on December 4, 1952 under the 
Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act 1951. 
He rec\lived a memoran-
dum from the Jagir Commissioner on February 23, 1958 regarding the 
compensation payable to him under s. 13 of the Act. On February 24, 
1958 he applied to the Jagir Commissioner for a copy of the judgment 
as the memorandum supplied to him did not show how the compensation 
had been determined. 
The application was returned to the appellant on 
March 11, 1958 with an endorsement that the copy could be had on pay-
ment of fees. The very next day the appellant complied with the demand 
and a copy of the judgment was given to him on March 18, 1958. The 
appellant preferred his appeal to the Board of Revenue on June 2, 1958 
but the Board dismissed it as time barred under s. 29 of the Act. The 
High Court upheld the order df the BMrd. 
In appeal to this Court, 
HELD : The High Court was not right in upholding the order of 
the Board of Revenue which ignored the provisions of ss. 34 and 149(2) 
of the Ryotwari Act and the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. 
f907 B-C] 
(i) U~der s. 34 of .th7 ~yotwari .Act the Board must guide itself by 
the prov1s1ons of the L1m1tation Act in force for extension and computa· 
tion of the period of limitation. It would appear that s. 149(2) was aim-
~d at givi~g a similar guide line to the Revenue Officer. To give the said 
mterpretat1on to s. 149(2) it is necessary to read "extension of the prin-
ciples of limitation" occurring therein as uextension of the period 
of 
limitation" for otherwise the section would be devoid of any meaning. 
902 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1969] 3 S.C.R. 
The word 'principles' therein was inserted due to inept or careless drafting 
and what was· meant was 'period' and not 'principles'. However,. even if 
the statute is read as it stands the principle of the Limitation Act is not 
only to dismiss a suit, appeal o'r application if filed beyond time but also 
to extend the time for filing an appeal if the delay is explained. 
That 
principle was clearly capable of extension in the present case. [905 D; 
906 El 
(ii) The general princ,lples of limitation are those contained in the 
Limitation Act of 1908 which was in .force at the date when the present 
appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 29(2) 
of the Limitation Act 1908 show that unless excluded by the Jagirs Act 
or Ryotwari Act, s. 12 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to 
appeals filed before the Board of Revenue under any of those Acts. 
[905 E; 906 CJ 
(iii) In view of the applicability of ss. 34 and 149(2) of the Ryotwari 
Act to the case, the time spent in obtaining a copy of the judgment for-
ming the basis or giving the ieasons of the decision should have been ex-
cluded in computing the period of 90 days under s. 29 of the Ja

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