MAHESHWAR TIGGA versus THE STATE OF JHARKHAND
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A B C D E F G H 482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R. MAHESHWAR TIGGA v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND (Criminal Appeal No. 635 of 2020) SEPTEMBER 28, 2020 [R. F. NARIMAN, NAVIN SINHA AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860: ss.376, 323 and 341 – Prosecution under – Alleging that the accused raped the prosecutrix at the point of knife 4 years ago when she was 14 years old and had continued to establish physical relations with her under pretext of marriage – Conviction under – By courts below – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: There is wide variation in the evidence with regard to the age of prosecutrix – Trial court had found the prosecutrix to be 14 years of age on the date of incident on the basis of her deposition – In the absence of positive evidence as regards her age, the possibility of her being above the age of 18 years cannot be ruled out – The benefit of doubt goes to the accused – The examination of the accused u/s. 313 Cr.P.C. was casual and perfunctory – The delay of 4 years in lodging FIR raises serious doubt about the truth and veracity of the allegations – In the facts of the case it cannot be held that the accused initially obtained her consent by putting her under fear or subsequently had fraudulently misrepresented in order to establish physical relations with the prosecutrix – The consent of the prosecutrix was conscious and deliberate choice – Conviction is unsustainable. s.90 – Consent given under fear of injury is not a consent – Consent given under a misconception of fact is no consent in the eye of law – But the misconception has to be in proximity of time to the occurrence. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Importance of the questions put to an accused u/s. 313 are basic to the principles of natural justice – Circumstances not put to an accused u/s.313 cannot be used against him. 482 [2020] 9 S.C.R. 482 A B C D E F G H 483 Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The prosecutrix in her deposition dithered with regard to her age by first stating she was sixteen years on the date of occurrence and then corrected herself to state she was thirteen. Though she alleged that the appellant outraged her modesty at the point of a knife while she was on way to school, no name of the school has been disclosed either by the prosecutrix or her parents P.W.5 and 6. If the prosecutrix was studying in a school there is no explanation why proof of age was not furnished on basis of documentary evidence such as school register etc. P.W.10, in cross examination assessed the age of the prosecutrix to be approximately twenty-five years. P.W.2, the cousin (brother) of the prosecutrix aged about 30 years deposed that she was six years younger to him. There is thus wide variation in the evidence with regard to the age of the prosecutrix. The trial court held the prosecutrix to be fourteen years of age applying the rule of the thumb on basis of the age disclosed by her in deposition on 18.08.2001 as 20 years. In absence of positive evidence being led by the prosecution with regard to the age of the prosecutrix on the date of occurrence, the possibility of her being above the age of eighteen years on the date cannot be ruled out. The benefit of doubt therefore has to be given to the appellant. [Para 7][487- H; 488-A-D] 2. The examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was extremely casual and perfunctory in nature. It stands well settled that circumstances not put to an accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him, and must be excluded from consideration. In a criminal trial, the importance of the questions put to an accused are basic to the principles of natural justice as it provides him the opportunity not only to furnish his defence, but also to explain the incriminating circumstances against him. A probable defence raised by an accused is sufficient to rebut the accusation without the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. [Para 8 and 9][488-E, H; 489-A-B] Naval Kishore Singh v. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 502 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 344 – relied on. 3. The delay of four years in lodgement of the FIR, at an opportune time of seven days prior to the appellant solemnising his marriage with another girl, on the pretext of a promise to the MAHESHWAR TIGGA v. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND A B C D E F G H 484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R. prosecutrix raises serious doubts about the truth and veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecutrix. The entire genesis of the case is in serio
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