MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION versus DILIP UTTAM JAYABHAY
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A B C D E F G H 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 1 S.C.R. [2022] 1 S.C.R. 148 148 MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. DILIP UTTAM JAYABHAY (Civil Appeal No. 7403 of 2021) JANUARY 03, 2022 [M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.] Maharashtra Recognition of trade unions and prevention of unfair labour practices Act 1971: Departmental proceedings β Misconduct proved against respondent-driver of driving the vehicle rashly and negligently due to which the accident occurred in which four persons died β Disciplinary authority passed order of dismissal from service β Labour Court did not interfere with the order of dismissal by giving cogent reasons and after re-appreciating entire evidence on record including the order of acquittal passed by the criminal court β However, the Industrial Court though did not interfere with the findings recorded by disciplinary authority on misconduct proved, interfered with order of dismissal solely on the ground that punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to misconduct proved and the same was unfair labour practice as per item No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act of 1971 β The same was not interfered with by the High Court β On appeal, held: The findings of enquiry officer and order passed by Labour Court and Industrial Court showed that respondent-workman was driving the vehicle in such a great speed and rashly due to which the accident had occurred in which four persons died β Even while acquitting respondent-driver who was facing the trial under ss.279 and 304(a) of IPC, Criminal Court observed that prosecution had failed to prove that the incident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the respondent only and none else β Therefore, even if it is assumed that driver of the jeep was also negligent, it can be said to be a case of contributory negligence β That does not mean that the respondent-workman was not at all negligent β Hence, it did not absolve him of the misconduct β As per the cardinal principle of law an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in different fields and with different objectives β Therefore, the Industrial Court erred A B C D E F G H 149 in giving much stress on the acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court β Applying clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act, 1971, to instant case, it cannot be said that the dismissal of the respondent was for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to the nature of the misconduct β Even the past record of service of the respondent was not considered by the Industrial Court β As per case of the appellant, respondent- workman was in service for three years and during three yearsβ service tenure he was punished four times β Therefore, it cannot be said that the order of dismissal was without having any regard to the past record of the service of the respondent β Therefore, in facts and circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court wrongly invoked clause No.1(g) of Schedule-IV of the Act, 1971, and wrongly interfered with the order of dismissal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer in the departmental enquiry and the judgment and order passed by the labour court as well as the Industrial Court and even the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the criminal court show that when the respondent was driving the vehicle it met with an accident with the jeep coming from the opposite side and in the said accident four persons died. From the material on record it emerges that the impact of the accident with the jeep coming from the opposite side was such that the jeep was pushed back 25 feet. From the aforesaid facts it can be said that the respondent β workman was driving the vehicle in such a great speed and rashly due to which the accident had occurred in which four persons died. Even while acquitting the respondent-driver who was facing the trial under Sections 279 and 304(a) of IPC, Criminal Court observed that the prosecution failed to prove that the incident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the accused β respondent herein only and none else. Therefore, at the best even if it is assumed that even driver of the jeep was also negligent, it can be said to be a case of contributory negligence. That does not mean that the respondent-workman was not at all negligent. Hence, it does not
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