LexMAHARAJ DHIRAJ HIMMATSINGHJI & ORS. versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.
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' - - MAHARAJ DHIRAJ HIMMATSINGHJI & ORS. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. NOVEMBER l2, 1986 [M.P. THAKKAR AND V. KHALID,JJ.] United State of Rajasthan Ordinance I of 1949, section 3(ii)- Meaning of the 'Law' explained therein-Whether the order (Ex. I) dated 13. 9.1946 passed by the Maharaja granting an-annual allowance A B _ of Rs.30,000 to each of his four Maharaj Kumars with respective effecc (-from the date of their birth, a "law" within the meaning of section 3(ii) C · of the Ordinance, so as to bind the State of Rajaschan_ Jodhpur was a sovereign State till April 6, 1949. The S?id Jodhpur State merged with the other sovereign States to form the United State of Rajasthan on April 7, 1949. On April 7, 1949, Ordinance No. I of 1949 was promulgated which provided for the contiituance of the laws of the D covenenting States (which included the Jodhpur State) in the United State of Rajasthan, by virtue of section 3 which provided, inter alia, that all laws in force in the aforesaid covenanting States immediately before the commencement of the Ordinance shall continue to be in force. On September 13, 1946, some two and a half years prior to the E merger of the then State of Jodhpur with the United States of Rajas- than, the then Ruler of Jodhpur passed an order CB/7114 (Ex. l) grant- ing an annual allowance of Rs.30,000 per annum to each of the four Maharajkumars from the dates of their birth and for the period of their minority. The amounts claimed by the sons by filing our different suits in 1955 were ~ecreed by the Trial Court. The appeals preferred by the F · State were allowed by the High Court holding that the order dated 13.9.49 granting the annual allowance was not a 'law' within the mean- ing of section 3 of the Ordinance. Hence the appeals by certificate granted under Article 133(l)(a) of the Constitution. Dismissing the appeal, the Court,< HELD: l. l In substance the amount directed to be pcid as per. Order Ex. I was nothing else hut "a gift" by the then Ruler to his sons, unrelated to any legal rights of the said sons (appellants). It did not create any legal obligation enforceable against the State of Rajasthan in- asmuch as the order in question was riot a 'law' obtaining in the then State of Jodhpur. And accordingly it cannot be held that the said order 209 G H 210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] I S.C.R. A continued to prevail as a 'law' in the State of Rajasthan under the 1949 ordinance or any other law. The order cannot therefore be enforced against the .State of Rajasthan treating it as a 'law' creating a legally enforceable obligation. [216C-O, H-217B] I .2 Having regard to the language of the order itself, it appeared B to be an executive order conferring a grant (or a gift) on the aifpeUants- plaintiff. It did not have the characteristics of a legislative measure and did not constitute a law inasmuch as it failed to pass the tests laid down hy the Supreme Court. [2 ISC-0 I State of Gujarat v. Vara Fiddali, AIR 1964 SC 1043 = [1964] 6 c SCR 461; Narsingh Pratap Singh Dea v, Sate of Orissa, AIR [1964] SC 1793 = [1964] 7 SCR 112; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhargavendra Singh, AIR 1966 SC 704 = [1966] 2 SCR 56; and State of Madhya PradeSh v. Lal Rampa/, AIR 1966 SC 821 = [1966] 2 SCR 53, referred to. D !.3 1.I so far as it relates to the period anterior to the passing of E the order (stretching from 8 to 21 years) the order cannot be said to be .. . an order paSSed in connection with his maintenance of the junior mem- bers of the Ruler's family for they had already been maintained at the expense of the State exchequer as revealed by the evidence, including the budget estimates. (2170] l.4 "Jagir" has been associated with the grant in respect of land revenue. In Thakur Amar Singhji's case, the Supreme Court construed the term "jagir" in that sense only. Though the expression "Jagir" would also be applicable to maintenance grants in favour of persons who were not cultivators, such as the members of the Ruling family, the F grant has been construed in relation to rights in respect of Ian<! revenue recoverable from the actual tiUers hy intermediaries known as Jagirdars. Testing the grant said to have been made under the order in question by the Ruler of Jodhpur in favour of the appellants, it cannot he said that it is a grant of a 'Jagir' in this sense, for, no question of alienation of land revenue in favour of the appellants is invo
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