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MAGUNI CHARAN DWIVEDI versus STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER

Citation: [1976] 3 S.C.R. 75 · Decided: 19-12-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: A.N. RAY, M. HAMEEDULLAH BEG, R.S. SARKARIA, P.N. SHINGAL · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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MAGUNI CHARAN DWIVEDI 
v. 
STATE OF ORISSA AND ANOTHER 
December 19, 1975 
75 
IA. N. RAY, C.J., M. H. BEG, R. S. SARKARIA AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.] 
Orissa Merged Territories (Village Offices Abolition) Act, 1963-Sections 
3, 5 and 9-lnterpretation of. 
In the execution proceedings to satisfy a decree dated 14-10-1958 for title 
and recovery of possession of certain "ganju Bhogra lands" obtained by the ap-
pellant against the State, the Notified Area Council. Rourkela claimed the suit 
·lands by an application u_/o XXI Rule 58 r /w ss. 37 and 38 Code of Civil Pr_o-
cedure. 
The said application ¥ias rejected. 
A revision against it was als'? dlS-
missed with the observation that the council was free to file a regular suit for 
adjudication of its rights. When the appellant took out a· fresh application for 
execution u/s'47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Council which never filed 
.any suit, and the respondent State which never appealed against the original 
decree, opposed the execution application on the ground that the decree became 
infructuous by virtue of s. 3 of the Oriss::i J\1erged Territories (Village Offices 
Abolition) Act, J 963. 
The Executing court upheld the objection and dismissed the execution peti-
tition. 
On appeal the Additional District Judge, by his order dated 2-5-1970, 
held that the decree was executable resulting in a second appeal to the High 
Court by the respondent State. The High Court allowed the appeal by its order 
dated 4-11-1974 holding that as the decree holder was not in actual physical 
possession of the land, the tenure ha~ vested in the State free from all encum-
brances u/s 3 of the Act and the decree was rendered "non est". 
Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court, 
HELD : ( 1) As a result of the abolition of the village office under s. 3 of 
the OMTA, all incidents of the appellant's service tenure, e.g., the right to hold 
the "bhogra land", stood extinguished 
by virtue of the provision of clause 
<b) of s. 3, an<l all settlements, sanads and all grants in pursuance of \vhich 
1he tenure was being held by the appellant, stood cancelled under s. 3 ( c). The 
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right of the appellant to receive emoluments was also deemed to have been 
terminated under Cl. (d) and by virtue of Cl. (f), his bhogra land stood resumed 
and "vested absolutely" in th.e State free from• all encumbrances. Section 3 oE 
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the Act, in fact, expressly provided tha~· this would be the result, not¥lithstand-
ing anything in la\v, usage, settlement, grant, sanad, order or "in any judgment, 
decree or order of a court." 
All these consequences ensued with effect from 
April 1, 1966 the date of coming into force of the Orissa Merged Territories 
(Village Offices Abolition) Act, 1963. 
From that date, the appellant suffered 
from these and other disabilities enumerated in s. 3 of the Act, the "bhogra land" 
'in respect of which he obtained the decree dated October 14, 1958 declaring his 
1itle and upholding his_right to possession was, therefore, lost to him as it vested 
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"absolutely'' in the State Government free: from all encumbrances. The decree 
for possession also thus Jost its efficacy by virtue of the express provisions Of the 
Act and there is nothing wrong in holding that the decree \Vas rendered incap-
able of execution by operation of law. [77 D-H] 
(2) Under sec. 5 of Orissa ~1erged Territoies ((Village Offices i\bolition) 
Act, 1963, once a "bhogra land" stood resumed and vested absolutely in the 
State Government to the exclusion of the village officer concerned, it was re-
quired to be "settled" with rights of occupancy thereunder. The settlement of 
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of the land contemplated·1 by sec. 5 had to be \Vith the holder of the village office 
and the other persons who \Vere enjoying it (or part of it) and as his co-sharers, 
Dr as tenants under him or: his co-sharers, but that was to be so on the condition 
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76 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[1976] 3 S.C.R. 
that "each such person, namely, the holder of the village office and his co-
sharers or the tenants under the holder of the office or his co-sharers was in 
'"separate and actual cultivating possession" of the land 
immediately before 
April, 1966. The words "each such person" occurring in sub-section I of Sec. 5 
include the holder of the village office so that in order lo be eligible for settle-
ment of the land with occupancy rights, he must also be in separate and culti-
vating possessio

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