MADHU LIMAYE versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Citation: [1978] 1 S.C.R. 749 · Decided: 31-10-1977 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.K. GOSWAMI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 9 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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749 
MAD HU LIMA YE 
v. 
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 
October 31, 1977 
[P. K. GOSWAMI, N. L. UNTWALIA AND D. A. DESAI, JJ.] 
Code of Cri111i11al Procedure, (Act II 1974), 1973 Ss. 397 (2) & 482-Scope 
of-Whether the bar ins. 397(2) refers to revisional powers of the Iiiglt Courr 
in all cases or only refers to revisional pOl'V'ers against interlecutory orders. 
The appellant \\'as prosecuted for having made statements dafamatory to the 
then Law Minister of the Government of !\'faharashtra. The Government de-
cided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under Section 500 of Indian 
Penal Code on the ground that the Law Minister was defamed in respect of 
his conduct in· the discharge of his public functions. 
Sanction was purported 
to have been accorded under section 199( 4) (a). Thereafter, the public prose-
cutor filed a complaint in the court of the Sessions Judge. 
Process was 
issued against 
the 
appeJlant 
upon 
the 
said 
complaint. The 
appellant 
filed an application to dismiss the con1plaint on the ground that the court had 
no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The appellant contended that the 
allegations were made against Shri Antulay in relation to what he had done in 
his personal capacity and not in his capacity as a l\.1inister. 
The appellant 
challenged the jurisdiction of the court on some other grounds, also challenging 
the validity of the sanction. 
The Sessions Judge rejected the contentions of the 
appellant and framed a charge against the appellant under section 500 of the 
Penal CoJe. The appellant, thereuoon, filed a revision· application in the High 
Court. The High Court without going into the merits held that the revision 
<ipplication was not maintainable in view of provisions of section 397(2). 
Allowing the appeal by special leave, 
HELD : 1. On a plain reading of section 482 it would follow that nothing 
in the code which would include section 397(2) shall be 
deemed to limit or 
affect the inherent powers of the High Court. 
However, it cannot be said that 
the said bar is 11ot to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all be-
cause it would be setting at naught one of the lin1itation imposed u11on 
the 
exercise of revisional powers. 
A happy and harmonious solution would be to 
say that the bar provided in section 397(2) opera•tes only in cxerci~e of the 
revisional power of the High Court meaning thereby that the l-Tigh Court \Vlll 
have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. 
The 
inhe-
rent power would come into play there being no other provision in the code for 
the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. 
In 
;:ase the 
impugnet1 
order brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court or 
for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference bv the High Cotirt 
is absolutely neces~ary, then nothing contained in Sf1ction 397 (2) can limit or 
affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. Such c.ases wou'd 
be few· and far betv1een. 
The High Court must exercise the inherent po\vcr 
very sparingly. [753 H; H4 A-DJ 
A111ar Natl1 and Ors. v. State of Haryt111t1 & Anr. Crl. A. No. 124 of 1977 
tlecit!ed on 29th July, 1977; niodified & reiterated. 
R. P. Kapuf v. The State of Punjab, [1960} 3 S.C.R. 388, referred to. 
2. Even if it is assumed that an order of the Court taking cognisance or hsu-
ing process is an interlocutory order, the bar created by section 397 (2) will not 
pr~v~nt the Hi~ Court 
from exer~isin~ its inherent po~er for stopping the 
criminal nroceed1ng as early as possible instead of harassmg the accused u!ito 
the end. (754 El 
3. Ordinarily and generally the expression "Interlocutory Order" has been 
understocxl and taken to mean as a converse of the term fina-1 order. 1735 J-11 
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750 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[ 1978] I S.C.R. 
S. Kuppusll'a111i l~ao v. The King, [1947] Federal Court Report<>. 180 and 
ScJ/e111an v. Warner, (1881) 1 C.B. 734 refe1Ted to. 
The strict test for interpreting the words 'Interlocutory Order' cannot be ap-
plied while interpreting it as appearing in section 397(2). The interpretation 
that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted 
nor justified. 
If it were so, it would render almost nugatory the revisional power 
of the Sessions Court or High Court conferred by section 397(1), Although 
the words occurring in a particular statut

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