LexMADAN LAL versus SUNDERLAL & ANOTHER
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
A MADAN LAL v. SUNDERLAL & ANOTIIER March 9, 1967 B [K. N. WANCHOO, R. S. BACHAWAT AND V. RAMASWAMI, IJ.] c D I G H Arbitration Act 10 of 1940-S. 30, objection on filing award-con- 1aining grounds for setting it aside-Whether Art. 158 Limitation Act applicable. An arbitration award in respect of certain disputes between the appellant and the respondents was filed in Court and notice of the ~ served on the appellant on September 30, 1957. The appellant filed an objection on November 3, 1957 attacking the validity of the award 011 various grounds. The respondents contended before the trial Court that the objection was in the nature of an application to set aside the award and contained grounds which fell under s. 30 of the Arbitration Act 10 o~ 1940; lberefore as the objection was filed more than 30 days after notice wu served o~ the appellant,. it was barred by limitation under Art. 158 of the Limitation Act No. 9 of 1908. The trial Court '!!'held the appel- lant's objection and an appeal to the High Court was dismissed. On appeal to this Court, HELD : Dismissing the appeal, The Arbitration Act contemplates making of an application to set aside an award on grounds mentioned in s. 30. This application must be made within 30 days of the date of service of notice as provided in Art. 158 of the Limitation Act. An objection petition in 1he nature of a written-statement may in appropriate cases be treated as such· .applica- ~on provided it is filed within the period of limitation prescribed. ~ 1f the court has the power to set a•ide an award suo m_otu that power cannot be used to set aside an award on grounds falling under s. 30, If taken in a petition filed more than 30 days after the· service· of notice, for in that case the limitation provided would be completely neptived. (151 E, G-H; 152 D-E] Hastimal Dalichand Bora v. Hlralal Motichand Mutlta, A.I.ll. (1954) Born. 243, Saha cl Co. v. Ishar Singh v. Krlpal Singh, A.l.R (1956) Cal. 321 and M,ohan Das v. Kwumal, A.I.R. (1955) Ajm. 47, distinguished. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No 990 of 1964. . Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 15, 1963 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in First Appeal from Order No. 30 of 1960. B. C. Misra and C. P. Lal, for the appellant. P. K. Chatterjee, for respondeq.t No. 1. S. P. Sinha and P. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No. 2. 148 SUPREME COURT RBPOllTS (1967] 3 S.C.ll. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the Allahabad High Court and arises' in the following circumstances. On May 20, 1965, an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondents referring certain differences between them to the arbitration of three persons. On January 19, 1956, an award was made, signed by two out of the three arbitrators as the third arbitrator had refused to sign the award. The award was filed in court on September 7, 1957 and the respondents prayed for a decree in accordance with the award. Notice of filing of the award was issued to the appellant and was served upon him on September 30, 1957. On November 3, 1957, the appellant filed an objection in the nature of a written statement. By this objec- tion the appellant attacked the validity of the award on various grounds. But the objection did not contain any prayer at the end, nor did it indicate what relief the appellant desired, though there were as many as 43 paragraphs therein. When the matter came to be heard in the trial court, the respondents contended that the so-called objection was in the nature of an application to set aside the award and contained grounds coming under s. 30 of the Arbi- tration Act, No. 10 of 1940, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Therefore, as the objection was filed more than 30 days after the notice was served on the appellant, it was barred by limitation under Art. 158 of the Indian Limitation Act, No. 9 of 1908. The trial court held that the appellant's objection was not maintainable, as his remedy was to apply under s. 33 of the Act, if he wanted the award to be set aside on the grounds raised in the objection. As ile·had not done so and as the objection was itself filed more than 30 days after the service of notice on him, he was barred from raising any ground for setting aside the award which fell under s. 30 of the Act. The trial court also held that the objectio
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.