MADAN LAL versus STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS.

Citation: [1976] 1 S.C.R. 492 · Decided: 28-08-1975 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: HANS RAJ KHANNA · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

492 
MADAN LAL 
v. 
STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS. 
August 28, 1975 
[H. R. KHANNA\ V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. C: GUPTA, JJ.] 
Indian Forest Act, 1927-S. 11-Scope of. 
A notification was issued by the State Government under s. 4 of the Indian 
Forest Act, 1927 declaring that it decided tp constitute some land as a reserved 
forest. The appellant preferred a claim under s .. 6 of the Act before the Forest 
Settlement Officer stating that he had sirdarj rights over certains plots of the 
land included in the notification. to which claim the Divisional Forest Officer 
filed an objection. 
The Forest Settlement Officer recorded an order on May 
A 
B 
9, 1955 that the appellant had proved his claim. 
The respondent alleged that 
C 
the order made by the Forest Settlement Officer admitting the claim of the 
appellant was passed without any notice to it, and in its absence, and that it 
came to know of the order on April 24, 1956 on whlch date 
the Forest 
Settlement Officer passed another: order. The State filed an appeal under s. 17 
of the Act "against the order dated 24th April, 1956". 
The prayer made in 
._,
the petition was 'this appeal be allowed and the orders of the Forest Settlement 
~-
Officer admitting the claim of the respondent be set aside with costs." 
The 
Appellate Tribunal, to which the appeal was preferred, held that the period of 
limitation should run from April 24, 1956 and not from the date of the first 
D 
order. 
· J 
Jn a peti.tion under Article 226 of the c·onstitution, the appellant challenged 
the order of the A11Pellate Tribunal on the ground (i) that the order of May 
9, 1955 was set aside though the appeal was directed not against that order 
but against the order dated April 24, 1956 which was not an appealable order 
under thi; Act and (ii) assuming the appeal was also directed against the earlier 
order, it was barred by limitation. The High Court held that since the prayer 
made in the petition of appeal was for setting aside the "orders'' of the Forest 
E 
Settlement Officer, the appeal must be held to have been preferred against both 
'i 
the orders and the appeal against the order recorded on May 9, 1955 was not 
~ 
barred by limitation because the said order must be deemed to have been passed 
on April 24, 1956 when the forest Department came to know of it. 
Dismissing the appeal. 
HELD : ( 1) Though the· date of the earlier order was not mentioned in 
the petition of appeal, there can be no doubt that the appeal was also directed 
F 
against that order. 
The prayer made in the petition of appeal referred n@t 
only to 'orders' in the. plural but also described them as orders admitting the 
claim of the respondent, though of course the order dated April 24, 1956 wa,s 
not one admitting the claim and as such, was not appealable. 
[496A-B] 
(2) The High Cdurt was right in holding that the impugned order should 
be deemed to have been passed on April 24, 1956 when the Forest Denar·ment 
came to know of it and the right of appeal granted to the Department should 
G 
be de'.ermined on that basis. 
[498'C] 
Section 17 provides a right of appeal from an order passed bv the Forest 
' \ 
Settlement Officer under s. 11 and lays down a time limit of three mooths 
i 
from the date of the order for presenting the appeal. Jn. this case. the order 
under s. 11 was recorded by the Forest Settlement Officer on Mav 9, 1955 
and the appeal under s. 17 filed on July 20, 1956 was obviou~ly long out of 
time if the impugned order could be said to have been made on May 9, 1955 
when it was recorded. 
[494DE, HJ 
H 
This section does not state what would happen if the Forest Settlement 
Officer made an order under s. 11 without notice to the parties and in their 
A 
B 
(; 
MADAN LAL v. U.P. STATE (Gupta, /.) 
493 
abjence. 
It would be absurd to think that in ·such a ca-se if the 
aggrieved 
party came to know of the order after the expiIY of the time prescribed 
for 
presenting the appeal from the order, the remedy would be lost for no fault 
of his. 
It is a fundamental principle of justice that a party whose rights are 
affected by an order must have notice of it. 
This principle is embodied . in 
Order XX r. 1 of C.P.C.. 
Though the FOrest Settlement Officer adjudicating 
on the claims under the Act is not a court, yet the principle which is really a 
principle of fair play and is applicable to all tribunals performing judicial or 
quasi-judicial functions, must also apply to him. 
[497E-F] 
Municipal Board, 

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.