MADAMANCHI RAMAPPA & ANR. versus MUTHALUR BOJJAPPA

Citation: [1964] 2 S.C.R. 673 · Decided: 29-03-1963 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

2 S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
673 
alternative basis, the plea of res judicata may be 
upheld; but an occasion will clearly arise for either 
clarifying the scheme or redically changing it so as 
to make the other worshippers eligible for appoint-
ment as Trustees. 
In the result, we reject all the contentions 
raised by the appellents 
and confirm the findings 
recorded by the High Court in favour of the respon-
dents. We are, however, not inclined to affirm the 
order of remand passed by the High Court, because 
we have held that the scheme framed in 1927 should 
be left as it is with the modifications which we have 
indicated in our judgment. Therefore, the order of 
remand passed by the High Court is reversed and 
the 
respondents' claim for a 
modified 
scheme 
allowed. 
The appeal is di,missed with the above 
modifications. 
The appellants will pay the costs of 
the contesting respondents throughout. 
MADAMANCHI RAMAPPA & ANR. 
v. 
MUTHALUR BOJJAPPA 
(l:'. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO 
and K. C. DAS GUPTA JJ.) 
Civil Procedure-Concurrent findings of fact-Powers of 
.<econd 
app.Zlate court-Insufficiency of evidence, if a ground 
for interference--Equity, if must yield to expre.ss provisions of 
/;xw-Single Judge's deci8ion-Grant of Special Leave-Con-
stitution of India (1950), Art, 133 (3)-Code of Civil Proce-
dure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), s. 100. 
The appellants' father bought 35 years hefore the date of 
the suit 40 acres of land from one Krishnappa out of his land 
measuring 166 acres. 
After the purchase 
the appellants' 
1963 
Ahmed At!am Sai t 
v. 
Iriayathul foh M ~khri 
Goj~ndrogotJkar J. 
1963 
M11.rrh 29 
19IJ 
Mt1tfmnanchi 
Ra,..;;• 
.. 
Muthtdur B•jj•H• 
674 SUPRE\lE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL-
father obtained possession and continued in possession <luring his 
life time. On his death tbe appellant's mother as their guar-
dian remained in possession until 1947. The respondent ob-
tained a 1nortgage decree against Krishnappa and in pursuance 
of the decree brought the p1 uperty tu sale and at the court sale 
the respondent himself hought the pioperty in 1943. In 1947 
he managed to enter upon the land in suit unlawfully. There· 
upon the appellants filed the present suit. The appellants' 
case was that the mortgage did not affect the appellants' title to 
the property which had already been purchased by their 
father and therefore the decree passed in the mortgage suit and 
the auction sale 
held 
thereunder tlitl not bind them. 
They claimed a declaration of their title and asked for 
a decree for possession and 
me.~·ni; profits. 
The respondent 
dmied that the appellants' father purchased the property from 
Krishnappa and asserted that they were cultivating the land 
as Krishnappa's tenants and therefore the mortgage, the 
mortgage decree and the auction sale 'vere binding against them. 
The ti ial Court on an exa1nination of the documentary 
as well as the oral evidence gave a finding in favour of the 
appellants both in rt"Spect of their title and their possession. 
Thereupon the respondent appealed to the District Judge 
who concurred with the trialJudge in his findings of fact and 
found that the appellants had proved both "their title and 
their po,.ession within 12 years before the date of the suit. 
Neither in the trial Court nor in the first appellate court any 
question of construction of any document or any question of 
drawing an inference of law arose. The questions which arose 
were simple questions of fact. 
The respondent appealed to the High Court and the 
appeal was heard by a singlejudge. 
Under the misconception 
that ajudge is entitled in second appeal, to interfere with 
even concurrent findings of fact of the courts below not only 
where the said conclusions are based on no evidence but also 
where the said conclusions are based on evidence which the 
High Court considers insufficient to support them, the learned 
single Judge examined the whole evidence and upset the con· 
current findings of fact given by the courts below. The appeal 
was allowed and the present appeal is hy way of special leave 
granted by this Court. The main q uestiun raised in the appeal 
was whether the High Court has transgressed the limits pres-
cribed by s. 100 Code of Civil Procedure in interfering in the 
concurrent findings of fact given by the two courts below. 
Held that it has always been recognised that the sufficiency 
or adequacy of rvidence to support a finding uf hct is a 
2 s.c.F.. 
S

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