LexM.W. MOHIUDDIN versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
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A M.W. MOHIUDDIN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA MARCH 21, 1995 B [M.M. PUNCHHI AND K. JA YACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.) . Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 : Ss. 13(d)(i)&(ii}-Bribe-Special Audit Officer of Local Fund Ac- C counts accepting bribe on the pretext or removing certain audit objec- tion-Caught while receiving bribe-Convicted and sentenced by CouTts below-"Obtained" pecuniary advantage-Meaning of-Sanction for prosecu- tion-Validity of-Framing of charges under the 1947 Act and subsequently under the 1988 Act-Contention not raised in the appellate Coun---Conten- D ti on not to be raised for the first time in Supreme Coult especially when no prejudice is caused to the accused-<:onviction confinned, but sentence of imprisonment reduced to the period already undergone-However, Sentence of fine with default clause-Confinned. For. accepting a bribe of Rs. 400 from a Sarpanch of a Gram E Panchayat, on the pretext of removing an audit objection, the appellant, a Special Officer under the Local Fund Accounts, was tried under S.13(d)(i)&(ii)r/w.Ss.13(2) and 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. According to the Prosecution he was caught red handed while receiving the bribe. He was convicted by the trial Court and sentenced to undergo six p months' R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000 in default of which to further undergo three months' R.I. On appeal, High Court confirmed the convic· tion and sentence. Hence this appeal. Appellant contended that the evidence of the prosecution was not trustworthy and reliable since there were a number of discrepancies, G omissions and contradictions; that it cannot be said that the appellant had "obtained" any pecuniary advantage since there was no proof that he actually accepted the illegal gratification; and that there was no valid sanction. H Dismissing the appeal, but modifying the sentence, this Court 864 - , I \ ) M.W. MOHIUDDIN 1•. STATE 865 HELD: 1.1. It is clear from the evidence of PWs_. 1' ~d 6 that P.W. 1 A had parted \\ith the tainted money and the same ca111e~~er the hold and control and hence into the possession of the accused and immediately a signal was given and the trap party entered the scene and completed the trap proceedings. Thus it cannot be said that the accused had not come into possession of the money. When once this requirement namely that he came B into possession of the money is satisfied, then the only inference is that he accepted the same and thus obtained the pecuniary advantage. (869-E] 1.2 It is proved that the accused made a demand and also got the affirmation form P.W.1 that he had brought the demanded money before entering the Hotel and at his instance, P.W.1 wrapped the money in the C handkerchief which was given by the accused and placed the same on the bag which was brought by the accused and as asked by him. So all these steps have to be taken into cons"ideration in arriving at the conclusion that the accused had in fact "obtained" the pecuniary advantage namely that he received the illegal gratification. There is no scope whatsoever to doubt this aspect of the case. Therefore, the prosecution has fully established D that the accused accepted the bribe money and thus obtained the pecuniary advantage thereby committing the offence completely. The evidence of P.W .. 1 regarding the demand of the bribe as well as the acceptance of the same is amply corroborated by the evidence of P.W. 6 as well as other cir- cumstances spoken to by P.Ws. 2 and 7. (870-F-H, 871-A] E Ram Krishan and another v. State of Delhi, AIR (1956) SC 476, relied on. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary Sth Edn. Vol. 3 page 1729 and Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Edn. Vol. II, Page 1431, referred to. F 2. Though initially appointed by the Commissioner, the accused was later absorbed in the Local Fund Accounts Department under the control of P.W. 8, the Chief Auditor. As per the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the sanctioning authority is the authority who is competent to remove him from service and there is no doubt G whatsoever that P.O. 8 is such competent authority to remove the accused from service. Assuming that the accused was initially appointed by the Commissioner he was no longer competent to remove the accused from service as he was not under the control of the said Commissioner nor he was in his department. P.W. 8 therefore is in no way subordinate to the H 866 SUPREME COURT REP
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