LexM/S. TRUTUF SAFETY GLASS INDUSTRIES versus COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, U.P.
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A MIS. TRUTUF SAFETY GLASS INDUSTRIES v. COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX, U.P. AUGUST 6, 2007 B [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND D.K. JAIN, JJ.] U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948: s.4~B-Notification No. ST-1/-755 J/x-9(1)-76 dated 31. 12. 1976 C Annexure-1/J-Entry 2-"glass and glass wares in all forms "-Meaning a/- Held: "Automobile safety toughened glass" including wind screen, door screen, sidescreen and back screen manufactured by assessee are covered under Entry 2 in Annexure III of the Notification and as such assessee entitled to purchase raw materials and package materials without payment D of any sales tax on such purchases~Notification No. ST-1/-4519/X-7(19)/87 dated 29.8.1987. Interpretation of Statutes: Principles of casus omissus and reading the statute as a whole and the E golden rule-Explained. Maxims: (i) quad semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislator; and F (i1) casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis Juris relinquitur-Explained. Words and Phrases: "in all forms" and "all kinds"-Connotation of The appellant-assessee was engaged in manufacture of 'automobile safety toughened glass' including wind screen, door screen, side screen and G back screen. It applied for grant of recognition certificate u/s 4-B of the U.P. Sales Tqx Act, 1948 in respect of notified goods mentioned in Entry 1 of Annexure Ill to Notification No. ST-11-7551/x-9(1)-76 dated 31.12.1976 i.e. "glass and glass wares in all forms". The Assessing Authority granted recognition certificate with regard to 'automobile safety toughened glass' H 860 J ~. - TRUTUF SAFElY GLASS INDUSTRIES'" COMMNR. OF SALES TAX, U.P. 861 authorizing the assessee to purchase raw materials and packing materials A at concessional rate of tax. But in appeal, assessee was held to be entitled to purchase raw materials and packing materials without payment of any sales tax. The order was confirmed by the Tribunal. However, the High Court confirmed the order of the Assessing Authority holding that 'glass' or 'glass wares" did not include the articles manufactured by the assessee. Aggrieved, the assessee filed the instant appeal. B Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: I.I. In Entry 2 of the Notification dated 31.12.1976, the expressiOn used is "in al/forms". The Entry contains an expansive description i.e. "glass" and "glasswares" "in all forms". There is no dispute that the C articles manufactured by the assessee are articles made of glass. The word 'form' connotes a visible aspect such as shape or mode in which a thing exists or manifests itself, species, kind or variety. The use of the word 'in all forms' is different from the expression 'all kinds '. The conceptual difference between the words "all kinds' and 'in all forms' is that the former multiplies items of D the same kind while the latter multiplies the same commodity in different forms. The use of the word 'in all forms' widens the scope of the Entry. It is to be noted that in the amendment made by Notification dated 1.9.1987 certain specified articles which otherwise fall within the definition of glass and glass wares were excluded i.e. ornamented or cut glass bangles. But no such exclusion was made in respect of articles manufactured by the assessee. E (Paras 13 and 15) (865-D, E, H; 866-A) Atul Glass Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1986) 3 sec 480, distinguished. 1.2. It is settled position in law that while interpreting the entry for the F purpose of taxation recourse should not be made to the scientific meaning of the terms or expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. This is what is known as "common parlance test". The dictionary meaning of 'glassware' means an article made of glass. (Para 141 (865-F) G 1.3. It is well settled principle i .. law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus a_nd the other in regard to reading the statute as a H 862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 8 S.C.R. A whole - appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute
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