M/S TECNIMONT PVT. LTD. versus STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS

Citation: [2019] 12 S.C.R. 229 · Decided: 18-09-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: UDAY UMESH LALIT · Disposal: Disposed off

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 11 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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M/S TECNIMONT PVT. LTD.
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS TECNIMONT ICB PRIVATE
LIMITED)
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 7358 of 2019)
SEPTEMBER 18, 2019
[UDAY UMESH LALIT AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005:
s. 62(5) – First Appeal – Validity of s. 62(5) – Condition of
25% pre-deposit for hearing first appeal – Reasonableness of -
Held: State is empowered to enact s. 62(5) – Thus, s. 62(5) is legal
and valid and the condition of 25% of pre-deposit is not onerous,
harsh, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India.
s. 62(5) – First Appeal – Condition of 25% pre-deposit for
hearing first appeal – Power of appellate authority to grant relief
against requirement of pre-deposit – Held: It cannot be said that
the first appellate authority in its right to hear appeal has inherent
powers to grant interim protection against imposition of such a
condition for hearing of appeals on merits – First appellate authority
is not empowered to partially or completely waive the condition of
pre-deposit contained therein in the given facts and circumstances
– Any such exercise would make the provision itself unworkable
and render the statutory intendment nugatory – Thus, the view taken
by the High Court as regards waiving of the condition of pre-deposit
is set aside.
Dismissing the appeals filed by the assessees and allowing
those filed by the State, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The High Court rightly held Section 62(5) of
the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005 to be legal and valid and
that the condition of 25% of pre-deposit not to be onerous, harsh,
unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. [Para 17][249-E]
 [2019] 12 S.C.R. 229
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 12 S.C.R.
1.2 In the instant case, the High Court found that the
Appellate Authority would have implied power to grant such solace
and for arriving at such conclusion reliance is placed on the
decision of this Court in Kunhi. Kunhi undoubtedly laid down that
an express grant of statutory power carries with it, by necessary
implication, the authority to use all reasonable means to make
such grant effective. But can such incidental or implied power be
drawn and invoked to grant relief against requirement of pre-
deposit when the statute in clear mandate says – no appeal be
entertained unless 25% of the amount in question is deposited?
Would not any such exercise make the mandate of the provision
of pre-deposit nugatory and meaningless? [Para 18, 19][249-H;
250-A-B]
1.3 If the inherent power the existence of which is
specifically acknowledged by provisions such as Section 151 of
the CPC and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be read with the
limitation that exercise of such power cannot be undertaken for
doing that which is specifically prohibited, same limitation must
be read into the scope and width of implied power of an appellate
authority under a statute. In any case the principle laid down in
Matajog Dobey case states with clarity that so long as there is no
express inhibition, the implied power can extend to doing all such
acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for
such execution. The reliance on the principle laid down in Kunhi
cannot go to the extent, as concluded by the High Court, of
enabling the Appellate Authority to override the limitation
prescribed by the statute and go against the requirement of pre-
deposit. The High Court was clearly in error in holding that even
when no express power has been conferred on the first appellate
authority to pass an order of interim injunction/protection, by
necessary implication and intendment in view of various
pronouncements and legal proposition expounded and in the
interest of justice, it would essentially be held that the power to
grant interim injunction/protection is embedded in Section 62(5)
of the PVAT Act. The first appellate authority is empowered to
partially or completely waive the condition of pre-deposit contained
therein in the given facts and circumstances. Therefore, the power
to grant interim protection/injunction by the first appellate
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authority in appropriate cases in case of undue hardship is legal
and valid. [Para 24, 6][238-F-G; 239-A, D; 254-B-D]
1.4 As stated in P. Laxmi Devi and Har Devi Asnani case, in
genuine cases of hardship, recourse would still be open to the
concerned person. However, it would be completely a different
thing to say that the Appellate Authorit

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