LexM/S SINGH ENTERPRISES versus COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAMSHEDPUR AND ORS.
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A B c MIS SINGH ENTERPRISES v. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, JAMSHEDPUR AND ORS. DECEMBER 14, 2007 [DR. ARIJIT P ASAY AT AND AFT AB ALAM, JJ.] Central Excise Act, 1944: s. 35(1) proviso-Appeal to Commissioner (Appeals)-Period of limitation-Commissioner (Appeals) declining to condone 21 months delay-HELD: Period upto which prayer for condonation of delay can be accepted is statutorily provided-Proviso to sub-section (1) of s.35 D makes the position crystal clear that appellate authority has no power to allow an appeal to be presented beyond the period specified therein -There is complete exclusion of s.5 of Limitation Act-Limitation Act, 1963-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226. E Words and Phrases: Expression 'sufficient cause' -Connotation of, in the context of s.35(1) of Central Excise Act, 144. The instant appeal was filed againstthe order of the High Court upholding the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals), Central F-· Excise and Service Tax, whereby he dismissed the appeal of the assessee filed after 21 months of the date of service of the original order, holding that the appellate authority did not have power to condone the delay beyond the period of 30 days from the date of expiry of 60 days as prescribed under s.35 of the Central Excise Act, G 1944. H It was contended for the assessee-appellant that the High Court, in exercise ofits power under Article 226 of the Constitution could condone the delay. It was submitted that logic of s.S of the 952 .. - MIS SINGH ENTERPRISES v. COMMISSIONER OF 953 CENTRAL EXCISE, JAMSHEDPUR Limitation Act, 1963 could be availed for condonation of delay. A Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD:l.1. Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as it stood at the relevant time, clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days time B can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. Thus, first proviso to Section 35(1) makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication of the decision or order. [Para 8] [956-A-C] 1.2. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35, as it stood at C the relevant time, makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only upto 30 days after the expiry of D 60 days which is the normal period for preferring the appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner (Appeals) and the High Court were, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of30 days period. [Para 8] [956-B-D] E 2.1. The Commissioner (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of Statute are vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the Statute. The period upto which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is F statutorily provided. [Para 8] [955-G] 2.2. 'Sufficient' cause is an expression which is found in various statutes. It essentially means as adequate or enough. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished for delay caused in taking steps. In the instant case, the G explanation offered for the abnormal delay of nearly 20 months is that the appellant concern was practically closed after 1998 and it was only opened for some short period. From the application for con donation of delay, it appears that the appellant has categorically accepted that on receipt of order the same was immediately handed H 954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R. A over to the consultant for filing an appeal. In any event, the causes .. shown for condonation have no acceptable value. [Para 10) [956-E-F; 957-A) JT.C. Ltd v. Union of India, [1998) 8 SCC 610, held inapplicable. B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5949 of 2007. c From the final Judgement and Order dated 03.01.2006 of the High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi in W.P.(T) No. 6360 of2004. Sunil Kumar, Abhay P. Sahay and Kuldip Singh for the Appellant. B. Krishna for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. I. Leave granted. D 2. Ch
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