M/S SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE LTD versus UNION OF INDIA

Citation: [2018] 14 S.C.R. 676 · Decided: 05-12-2018 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.Y. CHANDRACHUD · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · cites 2 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

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M/S SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE LTD
v.
UNION OF INDIA
(Civil Appeal No. 11866 of 2018)
DECEMBER 05, 2018
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
VINEET SARAN, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
s. 34 – Application under – Delay of 514 days in filing –
Condonation of delay – If permissible – Held: By virtue of s. 34(3),
recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be beyond
the period prescribed therein i.e. three months – The proviso thereto
allows this period to be further extended by another period of thirty
days on sufficient cause being shown – The words ‘but not
thereafter” in the proviso makes the legislative intent clear that
statutory period of three months is extendable by another period of
upto thirty days and no more – Section 5 of Limitation Act has no
application to the application u/s. 34 – However, the provisions of
s. 14 of Limitation Act would be applicable to the application u/s.
34 – In the present case, even if benefit of s.14 of Limitation Act is
given, in view of the proviso to s.34, only 30 days can be condoned
beyond the limitation period of three months – There will still be a
delay of 131 days in filing the application, which cannot be
condoned – Administrative difficulties would not be a valid reason
to condone a delay above and beyond the statutory period
prescribed u/s. 34 – High Court was not justified in condoning the
delay of 514 days in filing the application u/s. 34 – Application
u/s. 34 is dismissed on the ground that it is barred by limitation –
Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.5 and 14.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award
may be made only by an application for setting aside such award
“in accordance with” sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-
section (2) relates to the grounds for setting aside an award. An
[2018] 14 S.C.R. 676
676
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application filed beyond the period mentioned in sub-section (3)
of Section 34, would not be an application “in accordance with”
that sub-section. By virtue of Section 34(3), recourse to the court
against an arbitral award cannot be beyond the period prescribed.
Sub-section (3) of Section 34, read with the proviso, makes it
abundantly clear that the application for setting aside the award
on one of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) will have to
be made within a period of three months from the date on which
the party making that application receives the arbitral award. The
proviso allows this period to be further extended by another
period of thirty days on sufficient cause being shown by the party
for filing an application. The intent of the legislature is evinced
by the use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso. These
words make it abundantly clear that as far as the limitation for
filing an application for setting aside an arbitral award is
concerned, the statutory period prescribed is three months which
is extendable by another period of upto thirty days (and no more)
subject to the satisfaction of the court that sufficient reasons were
provided for the delay. [Para 8][681-C, G-H]
2. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the
extension of the prescribed period for any appeal or application
subject to the satisfaction of the court that the appellant or
applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within the prescribed period. Section 5
of the Limitation Act has no application to an application
challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
[Para 9][682-F-G]
Union of India v. Popular Construction Company (2001)
8 SCC 470 : [2001] 3  Suppl.  SCR  619 – relied on.
3. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with the “exclusion
of time of proceeding bona fide” in a court without jurisdiction,
subject to satisfaction of certain conditions.   From the scheme
and language of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the intention of the
legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act is not manifest. Having regard to the legislative
intent, the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34
M/S SIMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE LTD v. UNION OF INDIA
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of the Act of 1996 for setting as

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