M. S. SHIVANANDA versus KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND OTHERS

Citation: [1980] 1 S.C.R. 684 · Decided: 18-09-1979 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P.S. KAILASAM, A.P. SEN · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 3 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
684 
M. S. smv ANANDA 
v. 
KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION 
AND OTIIERS 
September 18, 1979 
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, P. S. KAILASAM AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] 
Karnataka Contract Carri'ages (Acquisition) Ordinance, 1916, Cl. 20(3) 
& Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) "Act 1976, Sections 19(3) and 
31(2)-Scope and effect of-Contract carriages acquired-Wh!ther emplrryees 
have a vested right of absorption. 
General Clauses Act 1897 (X of 1897) S. 6-Repeal of Statute-Right · 
acquired or accrued unaffected-Mere 'hope or expectation of or liberty to 
qpply for acquiring a right nor preserved. 
The Kamataka Contract Carriage (Acquisition) 
Ordinance, 
1976 was 
promulgated on January 30, 1976 with the object of acquiring the contract 
carriages operating in the State. 
Sub-clause (3) to cl. 20 of the Ordinance 
provided for absorption of certain categories of employees of contract car· 
riage operators in the service of the Corporation, and the ratio for absorption 
for the different categories of employees that were entitled to be absorbed. 
On the same day, the State Government made an order under sub-cl. (1) to 
cl. 20 of the Ordinance transferring the contract carriages that vested in the 
State Government to the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. 
This Ordinance was subsequently replaced by the 
Kamataka 
Contract 
Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 which was published in the Gazette dated 
March 12, 1976. The Ordinance was repealed by the Act, which re·enacted 
the provisions of the repealed Ordinance, With a saving clause in sub-s. (2) 
of s. 31 for preservation of any thing done or any... action taken. 
The Act 
was substantially in similar terms, except for the difference that the ratio 
prescribed by proviso to sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the Ordinance which laid 
down the categories of persons who could. be absorbed in the service of the 
Corporation, was substantially altered and a new ratio was inserted in the 
proviso to sub·s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act. Otherwise, sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of 
the Act and sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20 of the Ordinance were identical in every 
respect. Under the Proviso to sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20, the total strength of the 
employees of the erstwhile Carriage Operators allowable for absorption was 
7.9 per vehicle while under the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act, the 
ratio worked out to 4.45 per vehicle. 
Further, while under the Ordinance, 
conductors were entitled to be absorbed, the ratio provided under 
the Act 
shoWed that conductors were not included in the categories of persons who 
could be absorbed in the service of Corporation. 
The change in the ratio of absorption from 7.9 per vehicle under sub-cl. 
(3) to cl. 20 of the Ordinance to 4.45 per vehicle under sub-s. (3) of s. 19 
of the Act allversely affected a large number of employees of the erstwhile 
contract carriage operators who filed writ petitions 
in 
the 
High 
Court, 
• 
• > 
,, 
. .... 
rr 
... 
• 
1 
_-.J> 
v. s. KUTTAN PILLAI v. RAMAKRISHNAN & ANR. (Desai, l.) 685 
challenging the vires of the proviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 19 of the Act, which 
A 
dismissed the writ petitions. 
In the appeal and the writ petitions to this Court the question for consi-
deration was, whether the employees of the erstwhile contract carriage operators 
in the State of Karnataka acquired a vested right of absorption in the service 
with the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation under sub-cl. (3) to 
cl. 20 of the Karnataka Contract Carriage (Acquisition) Ordinance 1976. 
B 
Dismissing the appeal and writ petitions; 
HEID : 1. The High Court rightly observed that there was neither any-
thing done nor action taken and, therefore, the petitioners did not acquire 
any right to absorption under sub-cl. (3) to cl. 20. [692 CJ 
· 
2. The Ordinance promulgated by the Governor in the instant case was 
a 'legislative act'. of the Governor under Arl 213(1) and, therefore, un-
doubtedly a temporary statute, and while it was still in force the repealing Act · 
was passed containing the saving clause in s. 31(2)(i) providing that, notwith-
standing such repeal, 'anything done'' or any 'action taken' under the repealed 
Ordinance shall be deemed to have be~n done or taken under the. corresponding 
. provisions of the Act. [691 C-DJ 
3. In considering the effect of an expiration of a temporary Act, it would 
be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule. It requires very clear and umnistak-
able language in

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.