LexM/S. SERAJUDDIN & CO. versus THEIR WORKMEN
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
1962
S14·, of Uttar
Pratk1h
v.
Abdul Samad
Sribja Rao J.
1902
March I'
934 SUPREME COC'RT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.
arrest of the respondents was illegal and that the
High Court rightly ordered their release.
In the result, the appeal fuils and is dismissed.
BY Cov1a. In accordance with the opinion
of the majority, the appeal is allowed.
M/S. SERAJUDDIN & CO.
1;.
THEIR WORKMEN
(P.R. GAJENDHAGADKAR and K. ~. WA~CIIOO, JJ.)
I11dustrial
DispMle-Reference
b11
Stau Gol'emmenl-
r alidity-"A1)1)ropriate Goi·ern1nent
1
i -''Industrial dispute'',
in relation to 1ni·ne-l'onstrur.tion of-1'J(ine"-Definilion-
bidMslrial Dispuf.fs Ar.t, 1947 (J4of 1947), ss. 2(a), 2(a)(i),
2(j), 2(k)-Jfinr., Act, 1962 {-~··;of 19o2), "·'· 2(j), 2(k). 2(h).
/\. <lisp:.Ite covering clain1s n1adc by the employees \Yas
referred for adjudication to rhc tribunal by the State Govern-
ment of \Vest Bengal. The appellant r:iisecl a preliminary
objection against the validity of the refcrencr and urged th<Lc
uncler s. 2(a) the appropriate Govcrnmrnt \Yhich could make
a valid reference in relation to the present dispute was the
Central Govr.r11mcnt and not the Govcrn1nent of lVest Bengal
and so, the refr.rcnce "''as unauthorised and
inconlpet~nt and
the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal v.:ith it. The Tribu-
nal over-ruled this objection an<l the case was set do\vn for
hearing on the merit:;.
Against th_is finding, the appellant
prei'errc<l the present appeal hy special leave and the only
point raised \\·as that the hr.ad office of the appellant at
Calcutta hcing an inte~ral part of the mine, any industrial
dispute bet\vccn the said office and its ernployces is an
industrial dispute concerning a 111ine under s. 2(a)(i) and so
the appropriate Governn1cnt 1nust be the Central Government
and not the State Go,·ernmcnt. 'fhc q11cstion for decision \Vas
\Vhcther the present dispute can h<· said to he an industrial
dispute
concrrnin~ a 1nine
It \Vas argur.cl that the \\'ord
''industry" is wide enough to include the Head Office of a
mining company though, it may be situate<l a\\'ay from the
3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
935
place \vher·e the mining operations are actually carried on and
it is in the light of the said definition of the word "industry"
contained ins. 2(j) that the words "in relation to a mine"
mtist be construed.
Held, that in construing the words "an industrial dispute"
in relation to a mine, it must first be deterinined what a mine
means and it must be done without reference to the broad
definition of industry prescribed by s. 2(j). In the absence
of a definition of the word "mine" in the Act itself, what has
to be taken into account is the dictionary meaning of the wor<l
"mine" or as is contained in the Mines Act and judged in
that light, there can be no difficulty in holding that an
industrial dispute between the employees engaged in the Head
Office at Calcutta and the employer is not an 'industrial dis-
pute concerning a mine. The Head Office is not a mine and
so, an industria! dispute raised by the employees engaged in
the head office is not a.n industrial dispute concerning a mine.
The rights conferred on the lessee under a mining lease
can have no direct bearing on the construction of s. 2(a) and
therefore, the tribunal rightly held, that the present dispute
between the appellant and its employees at its Head Office
at Calcutta, is not a dispute in relation to a mine.
If el d, further that all industrial disputes which are
outsides. 2(a)(i) are the concern of the State Government
under s. 2(a)(ii); in other words, the g~neral rule .is that an
industrial
dispute arising between a employer and his
employees would be referred for adjudication by the State
0overnment except in cases falling under s. 2(a)(i); and so it
Is the extent of one o~ the . exception mentioned i.n s. 2(a) (i)
that has to be determined in the present case, and in determin-
ing the extent of the said exception, it \vould not be irrelevant
to bear in mind the scope of the provisions of the Mines Act
itself.
That is why the fact !hat an office of a mine is
outside the definition of a mine is of so1ne assistance in
interpreting the word "mine" under s. 2(a)(l) and therefore
the tribunal rightly came.to the conclusion that in the present
~ase th~ reference by the State GoverI1ment of West Bengal
was vahd.
CrvIL APPELLA'f}J JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal
.'fo. 35.5 of 1961.
·
Appeal by special leExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.