M/S RAYMOND LTD. AND ANR. ETC. ETC. versus MADHYA PRADESH ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
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A B c MIS RAYMOND LTD. AND ANR. ETC. ETC. v. MADHYA PRADESH ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS. ETC. ETC'. NOVEMBER 16, 2000 [B.N. KIRPAL, DORAISWAMY RAJU AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.] Electricity Laws: Minimum charges fixed on basis of minimum guaranteed consumption by Electricity Board-Whether consumer required to pay even if consumption is less than the minimum guaranteed consumption-Held, yes. D Whether consumer required to pay if supply by Board is less than minimum guaranteed consumption-Held, the Board shall be entitled to charge only for energy actually supplied-Electricity Act, 191011948. Constitution of India, 1950-Article 226-Principle of prospective over ruling-Application-Power of High Court exercising writ jurisdiction- E Held, High Court can apply the principle if it is found necessary in balancing the rights of parties and in the interest of justice-Articles 136, 141and142. Appellant-industries entered into an agreement with Board for supply and purchase of high tension electric energy for use in manufacture of their "(..., F products. ~s per the agreement, consumer have to pay minimum guaranteed amount to the Board fixed on the basis of minimum guaranteed consumption equivalent to 40% load factor of contract demand if the actual consumption falls below the minimum guaranteed consumption. On the basis, Board raised bills for a certain period for the minimum guaranteed amount. The consumers questioned the liability to pay difference amount between the actual ..,. Β· G consumption and the minimum guaranteed consumption, by filing Writ Petition before the High Court. The Division Bench, not concurring with the earlier decision of a Division Bench of the same High Court, referred the cases to Full Bench for proper interpretation. The Full Bench interpreted with reference to the agreement read with Tariff that whenever contracted H supply falls short of 40% of the contract load (minimum guaranteed 668 RAYMOND LTD. v. M.P. ELECTRICITY BOARD 669 consumption), then the Board shall be entitled to charge only for the reduced A energy actually supplied and not entitled to charge the minimum guaranteed amount and also held that this interpretation shall have a prospective effect from the date of its order. With the prospective declaration of law, no relief as prayed for by the consumers was granted and the Writ Petitions were dismissed by the High Court. In appeal to this Court, the consumers challenged the prospective declaration of law while the Board challenged the B view with respect to charge on reduced suppl_y/consumption. The Board contended that the minimum charges is not subject to either actual supply by the Board or consumption by the consumer and the. payment β’ of such minimum guaranteed amount is in substance a partial return for C various investments in the various installations and to. meet recurring expenses for maintenance. The load factor envisaged is said to be a measure of liability for minimum guarantee and not to cast any obligation on the Board to effect supply of energy so as to make it a condition precedent for casting liability on the consumer to pay the minimum guaranteed Β·charges. The consumers, on the other hand, contended that the contract must be construed as a whole in the context and object underlying the same and should be meaningful and useful. The consumers further contended that the quality, quantity and manner of supply have also to be taken into account in assessing the usefulness of the energy for industrial purposes and to pay the minimum guaranteed amount would result in grave injustice besides being inequitable an unconscionable. The consumers also questioned the principle of prospective over ruling contending that such principles cannot be invoked by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. The terms and conditions of supply, as envisaged in the contract and the statutory provisions and general conditions have been standardised for uniform application among consumers with variations merely necessitated by the different class or categories of consumers and there is D E F no scope otherwise for expecting any scope for individual or free bargaining G right in this regard by each consumer with the Board. Therefore, it is futile for a consumer to contend that the Board was at the dictating end and the parties were not e
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