LexM/S. RAVINDRA KUMAR GUPTA & COMPANY versus UNION OF INDIA
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[2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 142
A
M/S. RAVINDRA KUMAR GUPTA & COMPANY
v.
UNION OF INDIA
(Civil Appeal No. 8019 of 2009)
8
DECEMBER 03, 2009
(TARUN CHATIERJEE AND SURINDER SINGH
NIJJAR, JJ.]
Arbitration Act, 1940 - s. 30 - Setting aside of award -
c Dispute relating to civil works - Arbitration award - High Court
setting aside the findings of arbitrator- Correctness of - Held:
High Court erred in re-appreciating evidence led by parties
before the arbitrator - Arbitrator had duly scrutinized and
evaluated the evidence and gave elaborate reasons with
D regard to the clairn - Thus, finding of arbitrator not perverse
or based on no evidence - Order of High Court set aside.
Dispute arose between the parties with regard to civil
works. The appellant-contractor claimed losses due to
E hold-ups and delay in work. Arbitrator passed the award.
Respondent-Union of India contended that the delay in
execution of work was due to default of the contractor
himself; and that the arbitrator had acted beyond its
jurisdiction by allowing the claim contrary to the provision
contained in the agreement. The civil court made the
~
F award the rule of the court. Respondent filed appeal.
Division Bench of High Court set aside the finding
recorded by the arbitrator. Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
.
G
HELD: The High Court committed a serious error in
re-appreciating the evidence led by the parties before the
arbitrator. This evidence was duly scrutinized and
evaluated by the arbitrator. With regard to the claim, the
H
142
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RAVINDRA KUMAR GUPTA & COMPANY v. UNION
143
OF INDIA
arbitrator gave elaborate reasons. Therefore, finding
A
recorded by the arbitrator cannot said to be either
perverse or based on no evidence. A firm finding was
recorded that under the claim there was default and delay
on the part of Union of India with respect to: the payment
of RARs final bill, delay in appointing agency for ATT,
B
delay in giving decision and increase in height of Tent
plinth (given late). High Court erroneously substituted the
said conclusion with its own opinion on appreciation of
the evidence. Such a course was not permissible to the
High Court while examining objections to the award u/s. c
30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Thus, the impugned
judgment of the High Court does not fall within the limited
jurisdiction available to the Court for interference in the
award of an arbitrator. The impugned judgment of the
High Court is set aside. [Paras 11, 12, 19 and 20] [147-B-
0
F; 153-B-C]
State of Rajasthan vs. Puri Construction Company
Limited. and Anothers. (1994) 6 SCC 485; Arosan
Enterprises Ltd. vs. Union of India {1999) 9 SCC 449; Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. AIR 2003 SC
E
2629; Madhya Pradesh Housing Board vs. Progressive
Writers and Publishers (2009) 5 SCC 678; /spat Engineering
& Foundry Works, 8. S. City, Bokaro vs. Steel Authority of
India, B.S. City, Bokaro (2001) 6 SCC 347, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
F
(1994) 6 sec 485
Referred to.
Para 13
(1999) 9 sec 449
Referred to.
Para 14
AIR 2003 SC 2629
Referred to.
Para 15
G
(2009) 5 sec 678
Referred to.
Para 17
(2001) 6 sec 347
Referred to.
Para 18
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8019 of 2009.
H
,.
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL) S.C.R.
f
A
From the Judgment & Order dated 10.7.2007 of the High
Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Appeal from Order No. 242
of 2001 (Old No. 322 of 1998).
Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Sunil Prakash Sharma for the
B Appellant.
Bishwajit Bhattacharyya, ASG, Ashok K. Srivastava, Aditya
Sharma, Anil Katiyar, B. Krishna Prasad for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the Judgment dated
10.7.2007 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Uttrakhand
D at Nanital whereby the Appeal from Order (AO) No.322 of 1998
New No.242 of 2001 filed by Union of India challenging the
award of the arbitrator has been partly allowed.
3. The grievance madt:: by the appellant before us is that
the High Court travelled beyond its jurisdiction in re-appreciating
E the evidence led by the parties before the arbitrator and by
substituting its own conclusions for the conclusions recorded
by the arbitrator. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the award of the Labour Court had been madExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.