LexM/S. RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. versus THE STATE OF MADRAS & OTHERS
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(2) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 227 I959 it may be for the benefit of the parties to the differ- ence, must be regarded as inserted in the interest of the public also". Waman Shriniwas Kini In that case there was a provision made by the Legis- v. lature that disputes mentioned in the section of the Ratilal Act were to be determined by an Expert nominated by Bhagwandas & Co. the Board of Trade and it was contended that though not in the strict technical sense estoppel, it was a waiver of the provisions introduced into the Statute for the benefit of private rights. No doubt that was a case which proceeded on a question of jurisdiction but the judgment proceeded on the principle of waiver of a statutory provision inserted in public interest. Thus the plea of waiver is unsustainable. In our opinion, therefore, the judgment of the High Court is sound and the appeal must therefore be dis- missed with costs. Appeal dismissed. M/S. RAMAN & RAMAN LTD. v. THE STATE OF MADRAS & OTHERS (JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR and SuBBA RAo, JJ.) Motor Vehicles-Legislation empowering State Government to issue orders and directions-Interpretation-Nature of jurisdiction conj erred-Such orders and directions, if law regulating rights of parties-Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, z948 (XX of I948), s. 43A. The appellant and the fourth respondent along with others were applicants for a stage carriage permit. The Regional Transport Authority after hearing the applicants granted the permit to the appellant. On appeal by the fourth respondent, the Central Road Traffic Board set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the permit to the fourth res- pondent. The appellant moved the State Government in revi- sion but to no effect. He thereafter moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari quash- ing the orders of the Central Road Traffic Board and the State Government. The single Judge who heard the matter quashed Rapur J. I959 February xB. I959 M/s. Raman & Ranian Ltd. v. The Stats of Madras & Others 228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Supp. the said orders and directed the State Transport Appellate Tribu- nal, which was constituted in place of the Central Road Traffic Board, to dispose of the appeal according to law. On a Letters Patent appeal by the fourth respondent, the Appellate Bench of the High Court set aside the order of the single Judge and restored the order of the Central Road Traffic Board. Hence this appeal by special leave. The point for determination in the appeal was whether the order granting the permit to the appel- lant made by the Regional Transport Authority on the basis of an order issued by the State Government under s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948, could be set aside on the basis of another order imposing new restrictions issued thereunder while the appeal was pending before the Central Road Traffic Board and thus involved the question as to whether an order or direction issued by the State Government under s. 43A of the Act had the force of law, so as to create a vested right in the appellant. Held (per Jafer Imam and Subba Rao, JJ.), that s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948, properly construed, must be given a restricted meaning and the jurisdiction it conferred on the State Government must be confined to administrative func- tions. An order or direction made thereunder by the State Government, therefore, could not have the status of law regulat- ing rights of parties and must partake of the character of an administrative order. C. S.S. Motor Service, Tenkasi v. The State of Madras, I.L.R. 1953 Mad. 304 and Gopalakrishnan Motor Transport Co., Ltd. v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Krishna District, V ijaya- wada, A.LR. (1957) A.P. 882, approved. Consequently, in the instant case, the appellant could not be said to have acquired a vested right that was defeated by a new law enforced pending the appeal and the order of the Central Road Traffic Board could not .be set aside merely on the ground that it had decided the appeal on the basis of an order issued subsequent to the grant of the permit if such order was otherwise in public interest. Per Sarkar. J.-It could hardly be said that the rule that a court hearing an appeal from a decision shoul
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