M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY versus KHATOONBEE AND ANR.

Citation: [2017] 2 S.C.R. 1 · Decided: 09-02-2017 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: J.S. KHEHAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 4 judgment(s) · cites 1 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

f201712 S.C.R. 1 
· M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY 
v. 
KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
(Civil Appeal No. 2555 of2017) 
FEBRUARY 09, 2017 
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI, N. V. RAMANA 
AND DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.) 
Delay I Laches: 
Delay of 28 years - In filing claim petition uls. 166 of Motor 
Vehicles Act, 1988 - Entertained by courts below holding that.the 
1988 Act does not provide limitation for raising claim for 
compensation - On appeal, held: Even though no period of limitation 
is prescribed under 1988 Act, claim can be raised and can be 
considered to be genuine, so long it is a live and surviving claim -
Claim can be raised only within reasonable time - The question of 
reasonability would depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
case - In the present case, delay of 28 years cannot be considered 
as prima facie reasonable period - The. claim, in the facts and 
circumstances of the case, was stale and ought to have been treated 
as dead claim - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - s. 166(3). 
Allowing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1 A perusal of the provision of Section HOA of 
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 reveals that a period of limitation of 
six months (from the date of occurrence of the accident) was 
provided for, to· raise a claim for compensation. In the successor 
legislation, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166(3), 
as originally enacted, also provided for limitation of a period of 
six months for filing a claim petition. However, on this occasion, 
· a bar was introduced for entertaining a claim petition, a.rising out 
of a motor accident after twelve months (from the date of 
occurrence of the accident). Obviously, the period of limitation 
provided for through Section 166(3) of the 1988 Act, could be 
relaxed upto twelve months, by demonstrating that' there was 
sufficient cause for such delay. The period of limitation provided 
under Section 166(3) aforementioned was completely done away 
A 
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2 
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
[2017) 2 S.C.R. 
with, with effect from 14.11.1994, as Section 166(3) came to be 
deleted, from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. [Paras 4, 5, 6] [5-C-
E; 6-F-ll] 
1.2 Eve 1 though no period of limitation remains prescribed, 
after the amrndment of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 
1988, whereb: • sub-Section (3) of Section 166 came to be deleted 
yet it would be imperative to determine, whether at the juncture 
when the claimant approached the Motor Accident Claims 
Tribunal, the :laim was a live and surviving claim. A claim raised 
before the Mo •tor Accident Claims Tribunal, can be considered 
to be genuine, so long as it is a live and surviving claim. It is not 
as if, it can be c •pen to all and sundry,'to approach a Motor Accident 
Claims Tribnil d, to raise a claim for compensation, at any juncture, 
after the accid mt had taken place. The individual concerned, must 
approach the fribnnal within a reasonable time. [Paras 12 and 
13] [15-D, G- HJ 
1.3 The question of reasonability would naturally depend 
on the facts a1 d circumstances of each case. A delay of 28 years, 
even wi.thout . ·eference to any other fact, cannot be considered 
as a prima fa' ie reasonable period, for approaching the Motor 
Accident Claims Tribunal. The justification expressed at the 
behest of the 1 es pond en ts, for approaching the Tribunal, after a 
period of 28 years, that the Petitioners are poor person and they 
have no kno vi edge about the Law, cannot be accepted. 
Undoubtedly, the claim in the facts and circumstances of the 
instant case, w is stale, and ought to have been treated as a dead 
claim, at the pc fat of time, when the respondents approached the 
Tribunal by fil1 ng a claim petition, on 23.02.2005. Thus, the claim 
raised by the respondents before the Motor Accident Claims 
Tribunal, was not a surviving claim, wJien the respondents 
approached the· said Tribunal. [Paras 14, 15, 16] [16-A-B, D-E) 
Co-rporat1 on Bank " Navin J. Shah (2000) 2 SCC 628; 
'Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank v. 
Nee/am (: 005) 5 SCC 91 : [2005] 2 SCR 424 - relied 
on. 
Dhanna/,1/ v. D.P. Vijayvargiya (1996) 4 SCC 
652:[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 417; The New India 
MIS. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 
3 
Assurance Co.Ltd. v. C. Padma (2003) 7 SCC 
A 
713: [2003) 3 Suppl. SCR 677 - distinguished. 
2. The appellant was directed to deposit a sum of 
Rs.25,000/- towards litigation expenses, payable to the 
respondents. The aforesaid deposit was actually made s

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