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M/S. PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS versus PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL

Citation: [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 637 · Decided: 09-12-2002 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: R.C. LAHOTI · Disposal: Dismissed

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Judgment (excerpt)

MIS. PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS 
A 
v. 
PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL 
DECEMBER 9. 2002 
[R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.J. 
B 
~ Β·, 
Rent Control and Eviction: 
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; Section 14(/)(e): 
c 
Eviction Petition-On ground of bonafide requirements-Rejected by 
Rent Controller on the ground that premises let out was not for residential 
purpose-Reversed by High Court- On appeal, held: Where premises is Jet 
oui for comj:Josite or .mixed purposes, it is necessary to ascertain from the 
written agreement/deed the main and dominant purpose of letting if purpose D 
of letting is residential, any incidential or unauthorised user would be of no 
'> 
effect-Jn the facts and circumstances of the case, provision of Section 14(/)(e) 
attracted-Delhi Development Authority Act; Sections 14 and 29-Delhi 
Municipal Corporation Act; Sections 347 and 430. 
Words and Phrases: 
E 
'n1ixed userΒ·- 'abundant cautela '-Meaning of in the context of Section 
14(/)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 
Appellant-tenant was in occupation of tenancy premises as per terms 
of the Licence Deed. Respondent-Landlord filed eviction petition on F 
ground of bonafide requirements under Section 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent 
-
Control Act. Rent Controller rejected it since purpose for which premises 
have been let out was not residential and Section 14(l)(e) not attracted. 
On appeal, High Court reversed the order of Rent Controller. Hence this 
appeal by the tenant. 
G 
It was contended for the appellant that premises was let out for 
residedtial as well as non-residential purpose as per agreement/Licence 
Deed; and that as per explanation appended to Section 14(l)(e) of the Act, 
Legislature intends that even incidental user of premises for non-
residential purpose with the consent of Landlord would change the purpose H 
~. 
637 
638 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 
A of letting from residential to non-residential, Section 14(1)(e) not attracted. 
On behalf of Respondent-Landlord, it was submitted that pre-
dominant purpose of letting was residential only besides incidental user 
for purpose other than residential was not in conformity with local laws. 
B 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court 
HELD: 1.1. Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act protects tenants 
from eviction. An order for recovery of possession of the tenancy premises 
can be made by the Rent Controller on one or more of the specified 
grounds. It is not permissible under the Scheme of the Act to file an 
C application seeking an order for recovery of the premises let for non-
residential purposes on the ground of bona fide requirement. Letting out 
for composite or mixed purposes and whether the premises let for such 
composite or mixed purposes can be got vacated on the ground of bona 
fide requirement is not specifically provided by the Act. (634-B-EJ 
D 
1.2. The expression 'the premises let for residential purposes' should 
be construed liberally and not technically or narrowly; meaning thereby, 
where the premises are solely let for residential purposes they are 
undoubtedly covered by Section 14(1)(e) but even when the premises are 
let out for composite or mixed purposes if the predominant or main 
E purpose of letting is for residential purposes, the same would be included 
within the expression 'the premises let for residential purposes'. An 
incidental, secondary or unauthorized user of the premises for purposes 
other than residential would not take the premises out of the meaning of 
the expression 'the premises let for residential purposes'. In such cases, it 
would be necessary to find out what is the "main and dominant purpose" 
F of letting as distingui~hed from "subsidiary, ancillary or incidental 
purpose". [643-F, G; 644-B) 
G 
H 
Allenbury E11gineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri R.:m Krishna Dalmia and Ors., 
(1973] 1 sec 7, followed. 
Dr. Sewa Singh v. Smt. Revinder Kaur and Anr., (1970) RCJ 615 SC; 
Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 274; Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lal 
Ramnarayan and Ors., (1978( 1 SCC 58 and Hirata! Kapur v. Prabha 
Choudhury, (1988) 2 SCC 172, relied on. 
Lakshman Santu Sintre v. Balkrishna Keshav Shetye, AIR (1925) 
' ,. 
β€’ I 
PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS r. PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TA YAL 
639 
Bombay 398; Watter & Son ltd. v. Thomas, (1921) I KB 541; T. A 
Dakshinamoorthy v , Thulja Bai and Anr. AIR (1952) Madras 413 and 
Feyereisel v. Parry and Ors., (1952) I All E.R. 728, referred to. 
1.3. Once the terms of ten

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