M/S. PEICO ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICALS AND ANR. versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
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MIS. PEICO ELECTRONICS AND ELECTRICALS AND ANR. A v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. MARCH 9, 2004 [P. VENKATARAMA REDDI AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969; Ss. 2(0)(ii), 10, 33, 37 & 38: B Dealership agreement-Notice-Termination on ground of non- C performance as per terms of the agreement-Complaint-Commission holding that the Company indulged in certain restrictive trade practices prejudicial to public interest-Directed the Company to continue supply of the goods and take measures to amend the offending clause from dealership agreement-On appeal, Held: Allocation of an area/market for disposal of the goods amounting D to restrictive trade practice-Restricting one dealer to sell the products in certain area while allowing the other dealer, amounts to discriminat01y treatment-The Company could not impose such restrictions-However, in the absence of any finding on the issue of discriminatory treatment, charges of favourable treatment against other dealer not proved. Restrictive trade E practice-Scope of s.2(0)(ii) and Section 33(1)-Discussed. Dealership Agreement-Clause 7-Validity of-Held: since manufacturer could intentionally or arbitrarily withhold supply of goods and yet disown liability, it is per se restrictive trade practice. Jurisdiction of the Commission-Held: Commission vested with power to enquire into any restrictive/monopolistic trade practice upon information or suo motu-omission to record proceedings framing an issue does not vitiate the findings, however, adequate opportunity ought to have been given F to the affected party-Court, while testing validity of actions taken by the Commission on the procedural aspects, should avoid a narrow approach, and G adopt the approach which conforms to objective of the Act-However, Commission cannot assume the role of a Civil Court-In absence of findings as to how termination of the agreement would per se give rise to restrictive trade practice/circumvent any trade practice, the Commission should not have gone beyond its powers by reviving the Contract, and resuming supply of H 883 884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] 2 S.C.R. A goods-To that extent, direction of the Commission unsustainable. Appellant-Company manufacturing audio products, had a dealer since long and subsequently appointed another dealer, Respondent No.2, on certain terms and conditions. Later, the Company after serving a notice, terminated the dealership of Respondent No.2 in terms of Clause 29 of B the agreement. Respondent-dealer filed a complaint before the Commission alleging certain restrictive trade practices being followed by the Company. The Commission held an enquiry, framed five charges of restrictive trade pritctices against the Company and came to a finding that the appellant had indulged in certain restrictive trade practices prejudicial to public C interest; that Clause 7 of the agreement per se amounted to restrictive trade· practice and directed to amend the clause from the dealership agreement and not to terminate the dealership of Respondent No.2. Hence the present appeal. It was contended for the appellant-Company that the Commission D arrived at its findings arbitrarily without regard to evidence on record and so its findings are perverse; that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction by directing restoration of dealership and for deletion of Clause 7 of the agreement; and that it failed to give a finding to the effect that the alleged trade practice was prejudicial to public interest while E passing the cease and desist order against the Company. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. By virtue of Section 33, read with Clause (g) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, an agreement to allocate F any area or market for the disposal of the goods is deemed to be an agreement relating to restrictive trade practice as the allocation of a particular area or market for the disposal of the goods likely to hamper or restrict the competition. The Company could not impose such restriction in the course of dealings with its dealers. [891-D-F] G 1.l. The charge of discrimination against the ·company was held established by the Commission o!11Y on the ground that the other dealer was given freedom to sell the Company's products from a market, but the complainant, other dealer, was not allowed to sell the products from the same market. This has resulted in discriminatory
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