M/S PAUL RUBBER INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED versus AMIT CHAND MITRA & ANR.

Citation: [2023] 14 S.C.R. 28 · Decided: 25-09-2023 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: ANIRUDDHA BOSE · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 2 judgment(s) · cites 4 · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

[2023] 14 S.C.R. 28 : 2023 INSC 854
CASE DETAILS
M/S PAUL RUBBER INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED
v.
AMIT CHAND MITRA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 6149 of 2023)
SEPTEMBER 25, 2023
[ANIRUDDHA BOSE AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: To what extent the Court can take cognizance 
of a clause, relating to purpose for which a lease is granted, contained in an 
unregistered deed of lease for immovable property stipulating its duration 
for a period of fi ve years.
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – ss.106, 107 – Unregistered lease 
deed for a period of fi ve years – Inadmissibility – Purpose of lease – If 
for ‘manufacturing purpose’ – Burden to prove – Tenancy of “month 
to month” character:
Held: The subject agreement had a duration of fi ve years with a 
provision for renewal for a further period of fi ve years – Hence, under the 
fi rst part of s.107, for the said lease agreement to be admissible, registration 
of the same would have been necessary – That is the mandate of s.107 and 
ss.17 and 49, 1908 Act – The Court cannot admit it in evidence – This is 
a prohibition for the Court to implement and even if the Trial Court has 
taken it in evidence, the same cannot confer legitimacy to that document 
for being taken as evidence at the appellate stage – The parties cannot by 
implied consent confer upon such document its admissibility – Further, the 
lease was for use by the predecessor of the appellants “for the purpose of 
his business and/or factory” – The property was described in the schedule 
to be estimated 16 cottahs of land “with a factory shed/godown space” – 
Such description would not be suffi  cient to establish that the same was 
for manufacturing purpose – In the absence of a registered instrument, 
the courts are not precluded from determining the factum of tenancy from 
other evidence on record as well as the purpose of tenancy – In this case, 
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factum of creation of tenancy has been established – But the purpose of 
tenancy, so as to attract the six months’ notice period u/s.106 cannot be 
established by such evidence as in such a situation, registration of the deed 
would have been mandatory – Burden of proving that the lease was for 
manufacturing purpose lies on the party who claims it to be so – Onus was 
on the appellant-defendant to establish that manufacturing activity was being 
carried on from the demised premises – A mere statement by DW-1 or the 
purpose of lease as specifi ed in the lease agreement would not be suffi  cient 
to demonstrate the purpose of lease to be for manufacturing – This could be 
proved by explaining what kind of work was being carried on in the factory 
shed however, in such a situation also, the registration of the deed would 
have been necessary – In absence of such registration, tenancy would have 
been of “month to month” character – High Court did not err in dismissing 
the appellant’s appeal – Lease – Registration Act, 1908 – ss.17, 49. [Paras 
10, 11 and 14]
Registration Act, 1908 – ss.17, 49 – Nature and character of 
possession – “collateral purpose” – Plea of the appellant relying upon 
Sevoke Properties Ltd. v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution 
Company Limited (2020) 11 SCC 782 that for establishing nature and 
purpose of possession, even an unregistered document could be looked 
into as that would come within the ambit of collateral purpose:
Held: Sevoke Properties is not an authority for the proposition that 
nature and character of the possession in an unregistered lease deed could 
always constitute collateral purpose so that the Court could examine the deed 
for that reason – The purpose for which lease is granted forms an integral 
part of the lease deed in this case and this very issue forms one of the main 
disputes – The expression “collateral purpose” has been employed in proviso 
to s.49 to imply that content of such a document can be used for purpose 
other than for which it has been executed or entered into by the parties 
or for a purpose remote to the main transaction – Nature and character of 
possession contained in a fl awed document (being unregistered) in terms 
s.107, 1882 Act and ss.17 and 49, Registration Act can form collateral 
purpose when the “nature and character of possession” is not the main term 
of the lease and does not constitute the main dispute for adjudication by the 
Court – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.107. [Para 12]
M/S PAUL RUBBER INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. v. AMIT 
CHAND MITRA 
30  
SUPREME COURT REPORT

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