M/S. OMPARKASH SHIVPRAKASH versus K.I. KURIAKOSE AND ORS.
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MIS. OMPARKASH SHIVPRAKASH A v. K.I. KURIAKOSE AND ORS. NOVEMBER I, 1999 [K.T. THOMAS AND M.B. SHAH, JJ.] B Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Sections 16(1) 16A and 20-A-Power of court to imp/ead manufacturer, distributor or dealer in a case under the Act.-lnvocation of-When-Held, C power under Section 20-A cannot be invoked until the trial begins and after the trial ends-It can be invoked only after reaching the stage envisaged in Section 254(1)-Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Sections 2(g), 251, 254(1), 262 and 319. Food Inspector filed a complaint before the trial court against five D persons under Section 16(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Fifth accused filed a petition for impleading the appellant firm on the ground that it had purchased the food article not conforming to the prescribed standard from the appellant which was allowed by the trial court. Against the order of the trial court, appellant moved the High Court under Section 482 of the E Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that it could not have been impleaded before the commencement of the trial which was dismissed by the High Court. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellant has filed the present appeal Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Power of the court to implead the manufacturer, distributor or dealer, in cases involving offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is envisaged in Section 20-A of the Act. The essential conditions F for invoking the power under Section 20-A are that (1) the trial should have G begun already; (2) the trial must be of any offence under the Act allegedly committed by a person other than the manufacturer or distributor or dealer of the food article; (3) the court must have been satisfied that such manufacturer or dealer or distributor is also concerned with the offence; ( 4) such satisfaction must have been formed "on the evidence adduced before the 269 H 270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. A court." [273-B, E, F) 2. Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the court to proceed against any person appearing to be guilty of the offence and who has not been made an accused. One of the differences between Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 20-A of the Act is that, while in the former even if it B \ appears to the court from the evidence (either during inquiry or trial of the offence), that another person is to be tried along with the already arraigned accused, then the court can proceed against that other person, while in the latter the satisfaction of the court that such manufacturer (distributor or dealer) is also concerned with that offence must be gathered from "the evidence C adduced before it during the trial". In other words, the power under Section 20-A cannot be invoked until the trial begins and after the trial ends. [273-G, H; 274-A) 3. The term "trial" cannot be given a fixed meaning to be applied in all cases uniformly. The connotation of that word changes with the difference in D which the term is employed in a particular provision of any statute. [274-C-D) The State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey AIR, (1957) SC 389 = [1957) SCR 279 relied on. 4.1. Section 16-A of the Act empowers a Judicial Magistrate of First E Class to try the offence under Section 16(1) of the Act in a summary way. The scrutiny of Sections 262, 251 and 254(1) of the Cr.P.C. reveals that the trial of offences under the Act begins when the Magistrate asks the accused whether he pleads guilty or not as envisaged in Section 251 Cr.P.C., if the ' Magistrate opts to hold summary trial. Hence, evidence in a trial under the p Act can be adduced only after recording the plea of the accused as envisaged in the said section. Thus, it is clear that a Magistrate can implead any person under Section 20-A of the Act only after reaching the stage envisaged in Section 254(1) Cr.P.C. Thus, the position is clear that power under Section 20-A cannot be invoked before the stage of adducing evidence in the trial, nor G can it be invoked after the conclusion of the trial. [274-G-H; 275-8-C; HJ Mis. Bhagwan Das Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration, [197511 SCC 866 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R. Sahai and Ors. etc., AIR (1979) SC 1544 = (19791 3 SCR.625, relied on. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd v. State of MP. and Ors., [19951 H 6 sec 62 distinguished. OMPARKASH SHIVPRAKASH v.
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