LexM/S. NORTHERN INDIA IRON & STEEL CO ETC. versus STATE OF HARYANA & ANR .
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• --~. • - ' y r • · .• -~ • I • 677 M/S. NORTHERN INDIA IRON & STEEL CO ETC. A v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR . November IO, 1975 ~ B [A. N. RAY; C.J., K. K. MATHEW AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.] Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948-"Demalld Charge" and "Energy Charge"- H ow calculatrd in terms of power cut. The State Electricity Board bad framed, in exercise of its power under s. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, certain terms and conditions and, the pro- cedure in regard to supply of electricity to its consumers. For big consumers C the sysrem of tariff is the two-part tariff system comprising of (i) Demand charge and (ii) Energy charge. A "Demand charge" means the amount char~ble per month in respect of the Electricity Board's readiness to serve the consumer irrespective of whether he consumes any cn~rgy or not a.nd is based upon rertain factors. "Energy charge" means the ch~ge for energy actually taken by Jhe consumer and i~ applicable to the units consu~ by him in any month. This was in addition to any demand charge, if applicable. A schedule of tariff of energy was framed by the Board. Cl. 4(b) mentions how the monthly demand charge shall be calculated and sub-clause (f) of this clause states that in the event of lock-out, fire or any other circumstances con- sidered by the supplier to be beyond the control of the consumer, the consumer shall be entitled to a proportionate reduction of demand charges/minimum charges. As a result of shortage of electricity the State Electricity Board considerably restrkted the supply to large industrial concerns. Because of this the Board allowed some reduction in th!: demand charges. The appellant, who was a bulk consumer of. etfrtricity, could not get the full quantity as per the contract bet- ween the parties. The appellant, therefore, filed a writ petition that there should be either no demand charge at all. when the Board was not in a position to supply electric energy, or there should be a propo1iionate reduction of the deman<,! charge. The High Court noted the redlJ!Otion made by the f)oard and held that the Board was entitled to the demand charge. It did not, however, decide as to what should be the basis for and in what proporiion the demand charge should be reduced. The ap~llant also contended that no duty was leviab!e on the demand charge, under the Punjab Electricity (Duty) Act, 1958, but only on the energy charge, for the actual amount of energy supplied but the High Court rejected this contention. All(!wing the a@eal in part on the first contention, HELD : (1) The circumstance of power cut which disabled the Board to •give th., full supply to the appellant would be a circum.tance which disabled the coosumer from consuming electricity as per the contract and this was a circumstance which was beyond i!,s control and could not he considered other- wise by the Board. It entitled the consumer to a proportionate reduction of the demand charge. In a circumstance like this the obligation of the consumer to se.w at least 3 dayY notice on the supplier as per the later part of sub-clause (f) was not attracted as the requirement of the notice was only in the case D E F G • of s!tut-Oown of not Jess than 15 days' duration [682 A, B, C] Therefore, the inability of tbe Board to supply electric energy due to power cut as per the demand of the consumer according to the contract will be reflect- ed in and considered as a circumstance beyond the ccntrol of the consumer which prevented him from cons11ming electricity as per the contract to the extent it wanted to consume. [682, DJ 2-LI 59SCI /76 H A B c D E F G H 678 SUPRf.ME COURT REPORTS [1976] 2 s.c.R. (2) A reading of the clauses of the Schedule of tariff as a whole makes it clear that the duty under the Punjab Act is chargeable on the price of energy supplied in a month. Therefore, the duty is chargeable not only on the energy charge but also on the demand charge. It is, however, chargeable on the actual amount of demand charge realisable from the consumer. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDJCTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1306, 1310, 1370-1380 and 1422 to 1424 of 1975. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders dated the 9th July 1975 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandi_garh in Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 733, 595, 725, 681, 720, 723, 726, 728, 777, 780, 781, 833, 892, 884, 885 and 887 of 1975 re&pectivcly. ~·.'~ M. C. Bhandare, (In 1306) an
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