M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. & ANR versus M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. & ANR.
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
[2023] 15 S.C.R. 821 : 2023 INSC 1059 821 CASE DETAILS M/S NORTH EASTERN CHEMICALS INDUSTRIES (P) LTD. & ANR. v. M/S ASHOK PAPER MILL (ASSAM) LTD. & ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 2669 of 2013) DECEMBER 11, 2023 [ABHAY S. OKA AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.] HEADNOTES Issue for consideration: Whether Article 116 of the Limitation Act 1963, applies to proceedings under the Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 and; if the Limitation Act does not apply then, in the absence of Limitation being placed within the text of the Statute in question, could the Appeal fi led against the Order of the Commissioner of Payments be held as maintainable having been fi led after a period of nearly three years from the said order. Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 – Limitation Act 1963 – Article 116 – Applicability of Article 116 to proceedings under the 1990 Act – Absence of particular period of time prescribed in the statute to fi le an appeal – Principle of ‘reasonable time’ to govern: Held: The 1990 Act is not governed by the prescription of limitation u/Article 116 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the appeal thereunder, from an order of the Commissioner of payments cannot be said to be an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908– Legislature of the State of Assam has been categorical in limiting the application of the code to certain aspects of the Act only – Given that the Jogighopa Act allows for a Judge of the High Court to be the Commissioner of Payments and then categorically provides for an appeal to lie therefrom, Division Bench of the High Court further evidences the sui generis nature of the appeal procedure provided therein – Further, in the absence of any particular period of time being prescribed to SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 15 S.C.R. 822 fi le an appeal, the same would be governed by the principle of ‘reasonable time’, for which, no straitjacket formula can be laid down and it is to be determined as per the facts and circumstances of each case – Claimant- appellants were aggrieved by order of The Commissioner of Payments dtd.13.04.2005 – The appeal fi led thereagainst was on 05.112008 – It was submitted that in the intervening period, appellants pursued remedies by way of Contempt Petition before the High Court which was disposed of on 01.04.2008 without any particular relief having been granted – Appeal before the District Judge, u/s.22(8), Jogighopa Act, came to be fi led thereafter and the order in question was passed on 05.112008 – Neither the general nor the specifi c statute providing for an appeal from an order of the Commissioner of Payments within a specifi ed period of time, the Claimant–Appellants’ appeal cannot be said to be barred by time and is thus, maintainable – File restored to the docket of the concerned District Judge – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908– Interpretation of Statutes– “expression unius est exclusion alterius”. [Paras 28, 30.1, 30.2] Jogighopa (Assam) Unit of Ashok Paper Mills Limited (Acquisition Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1990 – ss.22(6), (7) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Applicability of the Codes: Held: s.22(6) of the Jogighopa Act makes suffi ciently clear the commissioner “for the purpose of making and investigation under this act” shall have the powers vested in “a civil court” under the Code to the limited extent as mentioned in (a), (b), (c), (d) – Not only u/s.22 (6) is the application of the code limited but further u/s.22 (7) – The application thereof is also equally well circumscribed therein, the Commissioner has been deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of s.195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – The description of the powers of either clearly testifi es to the intent of the state legislature to specifi cally restrict the application of both the said Codes, to only the extent provided – The principle of statutory interpretation: expression unius est exclusion alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other) supports such a view – Therefore, it is clear that the vesting of select few powers upon a Tribunal, or as in the present case, a statutory authority, does not equate the same to be a Court within the meaning of the Code – Further, s.22(6) stating 823 “the Commissioner shall have the power to regulation his own procedure
Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.
Lex