M/S. NAVA BHARAT FERRO ALLOYS LTD. versus TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P. LTD. AND ANR
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A B [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 900 M/S. NAVA BHARAT FERRO ALLOYS LTD. v. TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF A.P. LTD. AND ANR .. , (Civil appeal No. 1607 of 2004) NOVEMBER 18, 2010 [MARKANDEY KAT JU AND T.S. THAKUR, JJ.) Interim order: Held: A party who fails in the main proceedings cannot benefit from the interim order issued C during the pendency of such proceedings - On facts, in a writ petition, interim order of stay was passed against the collection of the disputed amount in favour of c,onsumers - However, writ petition was dismissed by the Court - The fact that consumers did not make the payment on account of the D operation of interim stay would not affect the enforceability of the demand of the disputed amount - Demand for payment of additional charges recoverable on account of the delay in the payment of the outstanding dues upheld - Electricity laws - Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 - s.49 - Clause 32.2.1.and E 34 of the Terms and Conditions of supply (TCS). The instant appeals by special leave arise out of an order passed by the High Court whereby writ petitions filed by the appellant were dismissed and the demand for additional charges/surcharge payable on the delayed F payment of outstanding electricity dues raised under Clause 32.2.1 and 34 of the Terms and Conditions of supply (TCS) was upheld. The High Court had held that TCS were statutory in G character and were not in conflict with any provision of the Electricity Supply Act or the Constitution of India. It also held that Clause 32.2.1 and Clause 34 of the said Terms and Conditions of Supply upon which the Board placed reliance for its demand did not violate any 900 NAVA BHARAT FERRO ALLOYS LTD. v. TRANSMISSION 901 CORPN. OF A.P. LTD. constitutional or statutory provision. The stipulated terms A and conditions were, according to the High Court, intended to achieve the objective mentioned in Clause (b) of sub-section 2 of Section 49 of the Act, -namely, to discourage delayed payment of electricity dues and to compensate the Board in cases of delay in the making B of the payment. Both these conditions, according to the High Court were intended to sustain the economic health of the Board. The appellants contended tJ1at the High Court had fallen in error in declining relief to the appellant which C according to them was due to it on the analogy of the orders of this Court in Kera/a State Electricity Board's case. It was submitted that in the light of the decision of this Court in Kera/a State Electricity Board's case the appellant-consumers could not be said to be in. default D ยท of payment of the outstanding amount during the period the interim order passed by the High Court in its favour had remained operative. It was further contended that this Court had in the above case and in Kanoria Chemicals's case dealt with a similar fact situation and granted relief, E ยท by awarding interest@ 18% to the Board to compensate it for the monetary loss that it may hav,e suffered on account of delay in the making of such payment and to prevent any prejudice and consequent injustice to the Board on account of the direction issued by the Court. It . F was argued that the appellant-company was ready and willing to pay interest @ 18% p.a. on the outstanding . amount for the relevant period but the demand raised by the Board being far in excess, deserves to be suitably reduced. G Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD:1.1. There is a basic fallacy in the analogy which the appellant draws between its case and the H A B c D E F 902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. cases referred to above. What is overlooked by the appellant is the fact that the decision of this Court in the Kera/a State Electricity Board's case enforced the terms under which the supply of energy was made to the consumers in that case. Award of interest@ 18% p.a. is not an innovation of this Court. The consequence of non- payment of the amount within the time stipulated was on the contrary prescribed in the tariff/ conditions subject to which energy was supplied to MRF the consumer in that case. It would not, therefore, be correct to apply the tariff conditions relevant to that case to the case at hand where such conditions are materially different. In that case, it is quite evident that this Court had upheld the claim for payment of interest @ 18% p.a. primarily because of the stipulation contained in the t
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