M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) versus STATE REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPARTMENT
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A B C D E F G H 508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 11 S.C.R. M/S NATESAN AGENCIES (PLANTATIONS) v. STATE REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENT AND FORESTS DEPARTMENT (Civil Appeal No. 5397 of 2010) AUGUST 20, 2019 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.] Wildlife Life (Protection) Act, 1972 – ss. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27 and 28 – Recovery of damages – Appellant-partnership firm had taken land on lease from its owner, the Mutt for purpose of cultivating commercial crops – The registered lease was for a period of 5 years i.e. 01.07.1972 to 30.06.1977 – The State issued notification dated 06.03.1976 for the purpose of wild life sanctuary which included the land in question – Thereafter, a fresh long-term lease for a period of 25 years (from 01.07.1977 to 30.06.2002) was made – The appellant and the Mutt attempted to get the land in question excluded from the sanctuary, however were unsuccessful – Thereafter, award of compensation for acquisition was under consideration, but instead of making award, the collector issued order dated 19.11.1993, excluding the land in question from the limits of wild life sanctuary – Aggrieved, the Mutt and the appellant filed writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed by the Single Judge – However, the Division Bench of the High Court did not approve the order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court and dismissed the writ petition while leaving it open for the appellant and the Mutt to approach the appropriate forum in their claim for damages – The Division Bench also acknowledged the power of the Government to withdraw from the notification and to refuse an award under the Land Acquisition Act – Thereafter, on 08.06.1998 appellant instituted the civil suit for recovery of damages against the State on the ground that the appellant was debarred from 1976 to 1993 from utilising the land in question – Single Judge of the High Court decided in favour of the appellant – However, Division Bench reversed the decree and dismissed the suit – On appeal, held: [2019] 11 S.C.R. 508 508 A B C D E F G H 509 After issuance of the notification dated 06.03.1976 and inclusion of the land in question, there was absolutely no occasion for the appellant acquiring any further right in the land after expiry of the term of lease on 30.06.1977 – So, the second lease (i.e. a lease for 25 years) was of no effect – Appellant had acquired no right under the said second lease and least any right against the State – Therefore, appellant had no right to claim damages – Further, appellant was not dispossessed and there was nothing on record to suggest that appellant was prevented by the State from going inside the forest and collecting usufructs – Thus, there was no basis for the appellant to maintain an action for damages. Limitation Act, 1963 – s.14 – Applicability of – Appellant- partnership firm had taken land on lease for purpose of cultivation of commercial crops – A notification dated 06.03.1976 was issued vide which land in question was acquired for sanctuary – The appellant and the Mutt attempted to get the land in question excluded from the sanctuary but were unsuccessful – Thereafter, instead of awarding compensation, the collector on 19.11.1993 excluded the land in question from the sanctuary – Aggrieved, appellant filed writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed by the Single Judge – However, Division Bench of High Court dismissed the writ petition while leaving it open for the Mutt and the appellant to approach the appropriate forum to claim damages – Division Bench also held that it was open for appellant to seek exclusion of the period during which they were prosecuting the matter in the High Court – Appellant filed civil suit for recovery of damages, which was decided in its favour by the Single Judge of the High Court, however, Division Bench reversed the decree and dismissed the suit – On appeal, held: It is settled that for applicability of s.14 of the limitation Act and exclusion of time spent in earlier proceeding, the matter-in-issue in both the earlier and the later proceeding must be the same – In the present case, the appellant in the earlier proceeding sought exclusion of the land from sanctuary and that State ought to take the land and pay compensation – Whereas, the claim in the present suit was founded on the ground that the plaintiff had suffered loss due to the proceedings under Wild life (Protection) Act, 1972 and then, due to exclusion
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