M/S. BAJAJ HINDUSTAN SUGAR & INDUSTRIES LIMITED versus BALRAMPUR CHINI MILLS LTD. AND ORS.

Citation: [2007] 4 S.C.R. 132 · Decided: 19-03-2007 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: AR. LAKSHMANAN · Disposal: Dismissed

Judgment (excerpt)

A 
M/S. BAJAJ HINDU ST AN SUGAR & INDUSTRIES LIMITED 
v. 
BALRAMPUR CHINI MILLS LTD. AND ORS. 
MARCH 19, 2007 
B 
[DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN AND ALTMAS KABIR, JJ.] 
~ 
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Section 80(1) & (2): 
~ 
c 
Setting up of a sugar factory by a company within prohibited distance 
limit from the proposed Unit of appellant-company-Appel/ant-company filing 
a suit/application under Section 80(2) C.P.C. against respondent-company 
and Union of India-No notice uls 80(1) issued prior to filing of such 
application-Trial Court directing appellant-company to ensure compliance 
of Section 80(1) CPC-Revision Petition-High Court directing trial Court 
D to reconsider the matter-On appeal, Held: High Court merely remitted the 
matter to trial Court to re-decide the entire matter as order passed by it 
earlier was non reasoned and non-speaking-Defendants in the suit were not 
served with notice uls 80(1) of the Code-Suit against them could not be 
instituted without complying with the provisions of Section 80(2) and without 
leave of the Court-Since leave was refused, the question of institution of the 
E suit does not arise-Under such circumstances, it is open to the superior 
Courts to grant such /eave-However, High Court has not granted such leave 
but directed the trial Court to re-consider the matter-Trial Court is bound 
to re-consider the question of grant of leave in terms of the directions of High 
Court-Hence, no reason is found to interfere with the order passed by the 
F High Court. 
Appellant is a registered company engaged in the manufacture of sugar 
and has various industrial undertakings at different sites in Uttar Pradesh. 
Union oflndia issued a lJirective making it compulsory to obtain Licence before 
establishing new Sugar factories and also made it mandatory for such sugar 
G factories to maintain a minimum distance of 15 Kms. from the existing sugar 
mill. Respondent No. 5 proposed to set up a sugar mill at Itai Maida, which 
was within 15 Kms. from the proposed unit of the appellant-company at Kalu 
,_ 
Bankat The appellant filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge against the Union 
of India and its authorities and Respondent No.5 inter alia for granting a 
H 
132 
--t---
BAJAJ HINDUSTAN SUGAR & INDUSTRIES LTD v. BALRAMPUR CHIN! MILLS LTD. 
133 
~ 
A 
decree against respondent No.5 by not allowing it to establish the factory within 
the prohibited distance limit. Since the suit was filed against the Union of 
India, an application was also made under Section 80 (2) of the Code of CMI 
Procedure for grant of leave to proceed against the Government and its 
authorities. However, no notice in terms of Section 80 (I) of the Code was 
served upon them/him. The Court did not grant the relief observing that there B 
was no urgency in the matter, which warranted immediate relief and the 
appellant was directed to ensure compliance of Section 80 (I) of the Cod~. 
_,J 
Aggrieved, the appellants filed Revision Petition in the High Court. While 
admitting the revision petition, the High Court directed Respondent Nos. 5 
and 6 to maintain status quo and they were restrained from continuing with c 
any developmental or construction activities at the proposed site. Respondent 
Nos. 5 and 6 filed an application for vacation of the interim order. Both the 
revision petition as well as the application for vacating the interim order, wei-e 
taken up for hearing together for final disposal by the High Court. Disposing 
of the Revision Petition, High Court directed the trial Court to reconsider 
the matter and the parties were directed to make all the submissions before D 
the competent Court of law and the same may be appreciated and considered 
by the Court. Hence the present appeal. 
Appellants contended that after the order passed by the High Court 
directing the trial Court to hear his application for interim relief, the trial 
E 
Court without doing so had in fact directed that the appellant's application 
under Section 80 (2) of the Code be re-heard; that the trial Court should have 
decided the application for interim relief without re-opening the question bf 
grant of leave under Section 80 (2) of the Code; that by directing the Trial 
Court to hear the appellant's application for interim relief, it had dispensed 
with the requia ement of Section 80 (2) of the Code or had impliedly allowed F 
the appellant's application for leave. It was, therefore, no longer open to the 
) 
Trial Court to direct re-hearing 

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.