M/S. ALOPI PARSHAD & SONS, LTD. versus THE UNION OF INDIA

Citation: [1960] 2 S.C.R. 793 · Decided: 20-01-1960 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.K. DAS · Disposal: Dismissed

Cited by 15 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

• 
S.C.R. 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
793 
clearly stated that the Central Government considered 
z960 
it against public interest to disclose to the petitioner 1 
h 5 , 
. 
d 
l 
agan Nat 
afou 
any facts or particulars as to 
ates, persons, p aces, 
v. 
nature of activities and the assistance given by him The Union of India 
other than those which had already been mentioned 
in the grounds of detention. Under Art. 22(6) of the 
Imam J. 
Constitution it is clearly stated that nothing in cl. (5) 
of that Article shall require the authority making 
an order of detention to disclose facts which such 
authority considers to be against public interest to be 
disclosed. In the present case the authority concerned 
had declined to disclose in the public interest any facts 
or particulars as to dates, persons, places, nature of 
activities and the assistance given by the petitioner 
other than those which had already been mentioned in 
the grounds of detention. In such circumstances, it 
would have been entirely inappropriate for the 
respondent to supply copies of the further materials 
placed before the Advisory Board although the 
Advisory Board may have required further informa-
tion in order to satisfy itself. 
The petition is accordingly dismissed. 
Petition dismissed. 
M/s. ALOPI PARSHAD & SONS, LTD. 
v. 
THE UNION OF INDIA 
(S. K. DAS, K. N. W ANCHOO AND J. C. SHAH, JJ.) 
Arbitration-Award, setting aside of-Error on the face of the 
record-Reference of specific questions-Contract-Terms of payment 
specified-Change of circumstances-Power of arbitrator to vary 
terms-Quantum M eruit payment, when justified. 
The appellants were appointed under an agreement in writing 
· by the Governor-General as agents for purchasing and supplying 
ghee required for the Army personnel with effect from October l, 
1937. After the outbreak of the World War II there was an 
enormous increase in the demand of ghee by the Government 
and the agreement was revised by mutual consent on June 20, 
1942, and the original rates of payment were scaled down. 
On 
December 6, 1943, the appellants made a representation to the 
Government for enhancing, the rates as conditions had become 
I960 
January 20. 
• 
794 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1960 (2)] 
r960 
abnormal. According to the appellants they were given assu-
rances that their claims would be favourably considered by the 
M fs. Alopi Pars!lad Government and relying on these assurances they continued to 
and Sons. Ltd. 
supply ghee in quantities demanded by the Government incurring 
v. 
heavy extra expenditure. The Government did not enhance the 
The Union of India rates and the matter \Vas referred to arbitration under the agree-
ment of 1937· 
Before the arbitrators the appellants contended 
that the agreement of 1942 was not binding upon them and 
claimed payment on the basis of the agreement of r937; and in 
the alternative claimed payment on the basis of increased rates 
of mandi charges, additional buying remuneration and contingency 
charges. These claims were resisted by the Government and it 
was denied that any assurances were given by the Government 
to enhance the rates. 
The arbitrators incorporated the points of 
contest in the form of issues. 
By an award dated May 2, 1954, 
the arbitrators rejected the primary claim of the appellant holding 
that the agreement of r942 was binding. On the alternative claim 
they awarded a sum of money for loss suffered by the appellants 
on account of establishn1ent and contingencies, and another sum 
for mandi and fiMncing charges. The award was filled in the 
Court of the Commercial Sub-Judge, Delhi, and the Government 
applied to have it set aside. The Sub-Judge held that though 
there was an error on the face of the award in ordering the 
payment of additional remuneration and financing and overhead 
charges the award could not set aside as specific questions had 
been expressly referred for adjudication to the arbitrators and 
the award was binding on the parties. On appeal the High Court 
held that no specific questions of law had been referred to the 
arbitrators and that the award was vitiated by errors apparent 
on the face of the award. 
Held, that the award was liable to be set aside because of 
an error apparent on the face of the award. An arbitration award 
may be set aside on the ground of an error on the face of it when 
the reasons given for the decision, either in the award or in any 
document incorporated with it, are based upon a le

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.