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M/S ALKEM LABORATORIES LTD. versus STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANR.

Citation: [2019] 14 S.C.R. 1081 · Decided: 29-11-2019 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

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Judgment (excerpt)

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1081
M/S ALKEM LABORATORIES LTD.
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No.1798 of 2019)
NOVEMBER 29, 2019
[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: s.20A –
Impleadment of appellant who was marketer of packed food articles
‘sugarless Jelly’ – The said food article was manufactured by a
separate entity – Prosecution case was that Food Inspector-
Respondent no.2 purchased packed jars of Jelly from the retailer
for testing – As per report of Public Analyst, the Jelly sample
contained sugar and therefore was misbranded – Retailer produced
a receipt showing that the jelly was purchased from  appellant –
Complaint filed by respondent no.2 for offence of sale of misbranded
food article under s.16(1)(a)(ii) r/w s.2(ix)(g) and 7(ii) – During
the course of trial, after closing of prosecution witness, the Retailer
examined himself as a witness for the defence under s.315 Cr.P.C. –
Subsequently, the Retailer moved an application under s.20A for
impleading the appellant as an accused, which was allowed by the
Special Magistrate – In the instant appeal, the plea of the appellant
was that the application for impleadment under s.20A could not
have been made by the Retailer – Held: Plea is not tenable – The
provisions of the 1954 Act clearly distinguish between a ‘vendor’
and ‘manufacturer’ of a food article – The very purpose of s.20A is
to enable the Court to implead the manufacturer or distributor
during the trial of the vendor of the food article, so as to detect and
punish adulteration at all stages of the supply chain.
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: s.2(ia) and s.2(ix)
– Adulterated and misbranded – A comparison of s.2(ia) of the
1954 Act which defines ‘adulterated’ and s.2(ix) which defines
‘misbranded’, shows that there is an overlap between the two
provisions – s.2(ia)(a) includes within the definition of ‘adulterated’
a case where a food article is ‘not of the nature, substance, or
quality which it purports or is represented to be’ – Whereas
 [2019] 14 S.C.R. 1081
   1081
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1082
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2019] 14 S.C.R.
s.2(i)(ix)(g) includes within the definition of ‘misbranded’ the label
on the package bearing any statement, design or device regarding
the ingredients or the substances contained therein, which is false
or misleading in any material particular; or if the package is
otherwise deceptive with respect to its contents.
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: s.11 – Prior notice
to the accused – Held:  Under the scheme of the 1954 Act, the
accused has to be given prior notice, as provided under s.11, that
samples of a food article manufactured and/or sold by them have
been sent for analysis, before the Public Analyst prepares report –
The 1954 Act does not envisage a situation such as the present case
where the sample is sent for analysis, and the Public Analyst’s report
is also prepared, but the marketer is informed several years later
that prosecution is sought to be instituted against them – During
such period, the food article being perishable in nature would most
probably be incapable of being sent for re-testing to the Central
Laboratory.
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: s.13(1) to (3) –
Whether denial of  right to get Jelly sample tested by the Central
Laboratory under s.13(2) of the 1954 Act would entitled quashing
of proceedings against the appellant for the offence of misbranding
– What is the procedure  to be followed in cases where proving
misbranding requires testing of the relevant food samples but the
corresponding charge of adulteration has not been made – Held:
It is absurd and discriminatory for the prosecution to, on one hand,
rely on the report of the Public Analyst under s.13(1) for proving
the offence of ‘misbranding’, and on the other hand, claim that the
accused cannot avail of their right to challenge the said report as
per ss.13(2) and 13(3) because it is not a case of ‘adulteration’ – In
such a scenario, the word ‘adulterated’ in s.13(2) would have to be
read as including ‘misbranded’ in so far as it relates to the ingredients
of the concerned food article, and the relevant clauses of s.13 have
to be complied with in their entirety – Therefore, where examination
of the contents/ingredients of the food article is integral to proving
the offence ‘misbranding’, the procedure prescribed under ss.11 to
13 of the 1954 Act has to be complied with, regardless of whether
‘adultera

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