M. PENTIAH AND OTHERS versus MUDDALA VEERAMALLAPPA AND OTHERS
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2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 295 Laws Order, 1951, only applied to all sales of goods r96o delivered and consumed in the State of first destina- 1 c t. If th d d l' d r . . ndian opper ion. e goo s were e !Vere lOr consumpt10n, It Corporation Lit>. is immaterial whether they were in fact conilFmed in v. the State where they were delivered.ยท The power of The state of the State to levy sales tax relying upon the territorial Bihar & Others nexus between tbe taxing power of the State and the sale, is impaired for reasons already set out to the extent to which it is restricted by the incorporation of Art. 286(l)(a)(i) and the Explanation thereto, in that Act. Therefore, sales effected on or after J a.nuary 26, 1950, where goods a.re as a direct result of the sale delivered in another State for consumption in that other State, are not liable to be taxed. The directions issued by the High Court will there- fore be modified as follows: The order of the Superintendent of Taxes is set a.side. He is directed to grant refund of tax pa.id in the light of this judgment. The appellant will be entitled to exemption from payment of tax if the goods are, a.s a direct result of the sale, delivered in another State for the purpose of consumption in that State. Appeal dismissed subject to mod~fication. M. PENTIAH AND OTHERS v. MUDDALA VEERAMALLAPPA AND OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. SuBBA RAO, K. N. W ANCHOO and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) Municipality-Committee constituted under old Act continued by repealing Act-Term of office-Power-If can effect sale of municipal land - Interpretation of statute - Power of Court- H yderabad District Municipalities .Act, r956. (H yd. XV I II of 1956), SS. I6, I7, I8, 20, 32, 34, 35, 76, 77 and 320. The respondents were the elected members of the Vicarabad Shah ]. November 7. 111'. Pentiah & Others v. Muddala Veeramallappa &ยท Others 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961] Municipal Committee, constituted in 1953, under the Hydera- bad Municipal and Town Committees Act, l95L That Act was repealed bys. 320 of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act, 1956, which came into force in 1956. That section provided that the committee constituted under the repealed enaclment was to be deemed to have been constituted under the Act and the members thereof should hold office till the first meeting of the committee was called under s. 35 of the Act. No election was held under the new Act; the old committee, which continu- ed to function, after duly passing a resolution ahd obtaining the necessary sanction from the Government, sold certain municipal lands to third parties. The appellants, who were rate-payers of the said Municipality, moved the High Court for the issue of a writ of quo warranto challenging the said sales under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed the petition. The contention of the appellants in this Court was that the members of the said committee were functus officio on expiry of three years from the commencement of the Act for s. 34 of the Act prescribed a term of three years and s. 320 of the Act did not provide any definite term for them. But if s. 34 was held to be inapplicable, neither could the first general election under the Act, for which s. 16 of the Act was the only provision, be held, nor could the first meeting of the committee called under s. 35 of the Act and the result would be that the old committee would continue indefinitely. Held, that the contention must be negatived. The word ' committee' in s. 320 of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act, 1956, did not mean a committee elected under the Act and the term of three years prescribed by s. 34 of the Act could not, therefore, apply to it. Construed in the light of well-recognised principles of interpretation of statutes and the scheme as envisaged by ss. 16, 17; 18, 20, 32, 34, and 320 of the Act, s. 320 of the Act could be no more than a transitory provision and it would be unreasonable to suggest that the Legislature which repealed the earlier Act with the express intention of constituting com- mittees on broad-based democratic principles, intended to per- petuate old committees constituted under the repealed Act. Section 16(1) of the Act, properly construed, was clearly inapplicable to the first general election under the Act and could apply only to subsequent elections. So far as the first general elec
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