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M.P. WAKF BOARD versus SUBHAN SHAH (D) BY LRS. AND ORS.

Citation: [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. 85 · Decided: 31-10-2006 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: S.B. SINHA · Disposal: Disposed off

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Judgment (excerpt)

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M.P. WAKF BOARD 
v. 
SUBHAN SHAH (D) BY LRS. AND ORS. 
OCTOBER 31, 2006 
[S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.] 
Wakf Act, 1995-ss. 32 and 83-Framing of scheme for managing 
affairs of Wakf property by Tribunal-Held: Not valid as framing of scheme 
A 
B 
is within exclusive power of Board and not Tribunal-s.32 prescribes the C 
powers of Wakf Board and s.82 lays down the powers of.Tribunal-These 
bodies cannot usurp the functions of one another-Matter remitted to Tribunal 
for fresh consideration-Wok/ Act, 1954-s.25. 
Land property in question was granted to Dargah. The Wakf Board 
declared the said property as a Wakf property. Board thereafter constituted a 
committee for managing the affairs of the Dargah. Private parties claiming D 
to be in possession of the said property, alleged forcible dispossession. They 
filed suit for declaration and recovery of possession on the ground that the 
orders passed by Board are null and void. In view of enactment of the Wakf 
Act, 1995, the suit was transferred to M.P. Wakf Tribunal. 
The Tribunal passed an order framing a Scheme for managing the 
affairs of the said Dargah. High Court held that the Tribunal had the requisite 
jurisdiction to frame a scheme. Hence these appeals. 
Disposing of the appeals and remitting the matter to the Tribunal for 
fresh consideration, the Court 
HELD: 1. Tribunal took into consideration the admission of the private 
parties that Majawar in question is their inherited property and their 
forefathers have been working as Mujawar in the Dargah. On the basis of 
E 
F 
the said admission on the part of the private parties, the Tribunal opined that 
there existed a Wakf. The purported admission on the part of the private parties G 
was a conditi'onal one; by reason whereof, the nature of the property being 
Wakf had not been admitted. An admission of a.party must be clear and explicit 
in a case where an inference is required to be drawn in regard to the fact that 
thereby he had admitted the title of the other. Generally speaking, even no 
title can be created by admission. 191-B; 92-EI 
85 
lI 
86 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. 
A 
Thayyil Mammo and Anr. v. Kolliath Ramunni and Ors., AIR (1966) SC 
B 
33, relied on. 
2.1. The Board itself could have initiated proceedings in terms of Section 
27 of the Wakf Act, 1954 but then no suo motu proceeding was initiated by it. 
191-D-EI 
2.2. If the proceeding was initiated by the Board for which it had no 
jurisdiction whatsoever, its order would be 'coram non judice'. 192-CJ 
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR (1954) SC 340 and MD, Army 
Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd., 120041 9 SCC 
C 619, relied on. 
Mis. D.N. Roy and S.K. Ban11e1jee and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 
1197013sec119, referred to. 
3.1. If the nature of dedication of the property does not constitute a Wakf 
within the meaning of the provisions of the Wakf Act, it must be proved that 
D it became aยทwakfby reason of long user. No such finding has been arrived at. 
(92-F) 
Motishah and Ors: v. Abdul Gaffar Khan, AIR (1956) Nagpur 38; Arur 
Singh and Ors. v. Radar Din and Ors., AIR (1940) Lahore 119, referred to. 
E 
3.2. If the property in question was not a Wakfproperty and the order 
registering the property as a Wakf property was invalid in law, the matter 
might have ended there. But, the Tribunal has gone a step further and directed 
framing ofscheme.193-DI 
3.3. The Tribunal .had been constituted for the purposes mentioned in 
Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995. It is an adjud.icatory body. Its decision is 
F final and binding but then it could not usurp the jurisdiction of the Board. In 
absence of any power vested in the Tribunal, the Tribunal ought to have left 
the said function to the Board which is statutorily empowered therefor. Where 
a statute creates different authorities to exercise their respective functions 
thereunder, each of such authority must exercise the functions within the 
G four corners of the statute. 194-E-F) 
H 
4. It is trite that when a procedure has been laid down the authority 
must act strictly in terms thereof. 194-FI 
Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch D 426, referred to. 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6975 of2004. 
I. -
M.P. WAKF BOARD v. SUBHAN SHAH (D) BY LRS. [S.B. SINHA, J.) 
87 
From the final Judgment and Order dated 13.3.2003 of the High Court A 
of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench, Indore in Civil Revision No. 463/2000. 
Shakil Ahemed 

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