LexM.P. STEEL CORPORATION versus COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE
Open in Lexace · Ask the AI about this caseJudgment (excerpt)
[2015) 7 S.C.R. 291
*M.P. STEEL CORPORATION
v.
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE
(Civil Appeal No.4367 of 2004)
APRIL23, 2015ANDAPRIL24, 2015
[A.K. SIKRI AND R. F. NARIMAN, JJ.]
A
B
Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 14 -Applicability and scope of c
- To the proceedings before Tribunal - Held: s. 14 is
applicable to the suits, appeals and applications filed before
the Court and not before quasi-judicial bodies - However,
even wheres. 14 may not apply, the principles on which s. 14
is based i.e. the principles which advance the cause of o
justice, would nevertheless apply- The principle of s.14
would, therefore, apply to exclude time taken in prosecuting
proceedings which are bonafide and pursued with due
diligence - Even prior to the institution of a particular
proceeding, time taken in steps taken for prosecuting such E
proceedings should a/so be excluded- In the present case,
limitation as provided uls. 128 of Customs Act being not a
complete code by itself, the pnnciples contained in s. 14
would apply- In the facts of the case, the period of pursuing
remedy by the appellant before the wrong forum, ought to F
be excluded - Matter remanded to the Commissioner
(Appeals) - Customs Act, 1962 - s. 128.
Customs Act, 1962 - s. 128 - Limitation period under-
Whether pre-amendment or post-amendment in 2001, G
• Para 53 of the judgement dated 23-4-15 to be read with subsequent order
dated 24-4-15.
291
292
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2015] 7 S.C.R.
A
applicable in the facts of the present'case - Held: Periods
of limitatiog~ are procedural in nature and would ordinarily
be applied retrospectively- In the facts of the case, limitation
period, as provided under pre-amended s. 128, would apply.
-
B
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The averment of the appellant in the
application for condonation of delay that they were
pursuing a remedy before another appellate forum which
c ought to be excluded, is sufficient for the appellant to
contend that Section 14 of the Limitation Act or principles
laid down under it would be attracted to the facts of the
present casa. [Para 7) [306-B; 307-B]
D
2. Conditions 1 to 4 mentioned in the **Consolidated
Engineering case have, in fact, been met by the appellant
Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil
proceedings prosecuted by the same party. The prior
proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and
E in good faith. The earlier Supreme Court order dated
12.3.2003 in the previous litigation itself points out that
there was some confusion as to whether what was
appealed against, was the Superintendent's order or the
Collector's order. The appellant bona fide believed that
F it was the Collector's order which was appealed against
and hence an appeal to CEGAT would be maintainable.
Thus, neither was there any negligence, lapse or inaction
on facts nor did the appellant delay proceedings to
harass the Department by pretending that there was a
G mistake. Condition (3) was also directly met- this Court
in the order-dated 12.3.2003 set aside CEGAT's order on
the ground that it was without jurisdiction. It is
indisputable that the earlier proceeding and the later
proceeding relate to the same matter in issue and thus
H condition 4 is also met. [Para 7] [306-C-H]
M.P. STEEL CORP. v. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE 293
3. A perusal of the Limitation Act, 1963 would show A
that the bar of limitation contained in the Schedule to
the Act applies to suits, appeals, and applications. "Suit"
is defined in Section 2(1) as not including an appeal or
an application. The word "Court" is not defined under
the Act. However, it appears in a number of its provisions B
viz. Sections 4,5, 13, 17(2),21 of the Limitation Act. On a
plain reading of the provision' of the Limitation Act, it
becomes clear that suits, appeals and applications are
only to be considered {from the limitation point of view)
if they are filed in courts and not in quasi-judicial bodies. C
[Paras 8 and 16) [307-C-D; 311-H; 312-A]
Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd. 1950
SCR 459; Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (1969) 1 SCC 873:1970 (1) SCR 51; D
Nityananda, M. Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation &
Ors. (1969) 2 SCC 199: 1970 (1) SCR 396 - relied on.
Cooper v. Wilson - referred to.
4. Under the constitutional scheme, the judiciary is
dealt with in Chapter IV of Part V and Chapter V of Part
VI. When the ConstituExcerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.