M.M. QUASIM versus MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS.

Citation: [1981] 3 S.C.R. 367 · Decided: 07-04-1981 · Supreme Court of India · Bench: D.A. DESAI · Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed

Cited by 1 judgment(s) · see the full citation network in Lexace

Judgment (excerpt)

y 
. .,.. 
367 
M.M. QUASlM 
v. 
MANOHAR LAL SHARMA & ORS. 
April 7, 1981 
(D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.] 
Bihar BuildingJ· (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1947-S.r. 2( d), 
JJ(I)(c) Expln. and ll(I)(d)-Landlord-Meaning of-Suit for eviction a/tenant 
on ground o[bo11ajide persolUJI requirement aud default-Partition of properties of 
landlord- Suit property a/lolled to a perso11not a party to the eviction proceedings 
- Whether landlord entitled to maintain and continue evtrtion proceedings. 
Interpretation of Statures-Admin/strtlf ion a/ Rent Acrs-Co_urts to bear in 
mind object and intendment of legislaturt. 
Words and Phrases-Land/ord-Meanin.t? of-Ss. 2( d) and II (I)( c) Expln. 
Bihar Buildings (Lease, RtJu and EvictiOII) Control Act, 1947. 
Respondents 1 and 2 are the brother's sons of Respondent No. 3. These 
respondents commenced an action for ejectment of the appellant from a shop 
under section J J(l)(c) & (d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) 
Control Act, 1947, alleging that the respondents in good fnilh required posses· 
sion of the shop for opening an office and a clinic by the first respondent who 
had become a qualified medical practitioner, and that there was default In 
payment of rent for a period of three months i.e. September, October and 
November, 1972. The appellant contested the suit for eviction contending that 
he did not commit default in payment of rent for tho three months uod that 
the same was paid but no receipt was passed and that !IS the respondents were 
avoiding the statutory liability of passing the receipt acknowledging payment 
of rent, the appellant was forced to send the rent by money-order from Decem-
ber, 1"972 and he sent the same month after month, und therefore, he could 
not be dubbed a defaulter. The ground for personal requirement was con-
troverted contending that the property belonged to a flrm, and therefore, the 
same cannot be claimed for the use of any one partner for his business other than 
the business of the firm. It was further contended that the respondents also owned 
a number of houses and their requirementfor Respondent No. l was incorrect 
and unwarranted. 
The Trial Court held against the appellant both on the Question of default 
in payment of rent and personal requirement and ordered eviction. 
The appellant preferred an appeal and when the appeal was pending before 
the appellate authority, he moved an application under Order 41, Rule 27 of the 
Code of CiviJ Procedure contending that there had been a partition of the pro-
perties amongst the members of the firm and the suit shop bad been alloued 
A 
8 
c 
D 
E 
F · 
G 
H 
368 
SUPREME COURT REPORTS 
(1981) 3 S.C.R. 
A 
to one 'P' who was neither a plaintiff nor a party to the proceedings and if the 
shop belonged to him as an exclusive owner, the respondents and espcciaJiy 
respondent No. l could not seck to evict the appellant for his personal require· 
meot of the suit shop. The appellate judge holding that the respondents were 
accepted by the appellant as the landlords of the suit shop, the subsequent 
partition decree would not help the appellant and agreeing with the finding of 
the Trial Court that there was default in payment of rent for a period of three 
B 
months, he dismissed the appeal. 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
The second appeal to the High Court by the appellant was dismissed, hold· 
ing that the appellant had not moved the first appellate court with a proper appli-
cation under order 41, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as there was no 
such application on the record of the case the contention could not be enter-
tained, and that the appellant did not chaUenge the finding of the courts on the 
question of default in payment of rent. 
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant 
tenant that : (I) the High Court was in error in rejecting the contention of the 
appellant that the ground of personal requirement was no more available to the 
respondents in view of the partition decree because not only the landlord 
must prove his requirement at the commencement of the action but the 
landlord for whose requirement the action is commenced must show that his 
requirement continues throughout the course of proceedings and that he had a 
subsisting interest in the premises of which possession is sought for his own use, 
(2) the High Court was in error in observing that in the absence of a proper 
application under o

Excerpt shown. Read the full judgment & AI analysis in Lexace.